Abstract

Military integration is intended to facilitate postconflict stabilization by creating unified armed forces from formerly antagonistic armed groups. However, integrated armies often struggle to overcome the factional identities of their soldiers, raising questions about interventionists’ ability to produce military cohesion during such processes. Yet, in the established scholarship on military cohesion, largely derived from the study of Western armed forces, internal small-group social dynamics are privileged over and above broader societal and political identities. This article examines the postconflict military integration program conducted in Sierra Leone to test extant theories of military “social cohesion.” Contrary to theoretical expectations, military cohesion in Sierra Leone proved highly reliant on wider (and highly politicized) societal identities, undermining integration efforts. This finding not only challenges existing understandings of social cohesion and its determinants but also the utility of military integration as a vehicle for postconflict stabilization and civil-military change.

摘要

军事融合的目的是通过从以前的敌对武装团体中建立统一的武装力量，促进冲突后的稳定。但是，综合部队常常难以克服其士兵的派系身份，从而引发了有关干预主义者在这种过程中产生军事凝聚力的能力的问题。然而，在已建立的关于军事凝聚力的奖学金中，很大程度上是从对西方武装力量的研究中得出的，内部的小团体社会动力在更广泛的社会和政治认同之上享有特权。本文研究了在塞拉利昂实施的冲突后军事融合计划，以检验现有的军事“社会凝聚力”理论。与理论期望相反，事实证明，塞拉利昂的军事凝聚力高度依赖于更广泛的（以及高度政治化的）社会认同，从而破坏了一体化的努力。这一发现不仅挑战了对社会凝聚力及其决定因素的现有理解，而且挑战了军事一体化作为冲突后稳定和军民变革的工具的效用。