Abstract

This article examines the proliferation-inhibiting effect of US alliances. Existing explanations for nuclear reversals of US allies have focused either on the assurance that alliances provide or on US threats of abandonment. However, neither model can account for the fact that allied leaders disagreed over the reversal decision. Also, whether an ally agreed to or rejected nuclear restraint depended on which policymakers carried the day as much as on external factors. To explain why some policymakers accept and others refuse nuclear reversal, I draw on a psychological aspect of US alliances: the social pressure inherent in demands by the United States as an ally holding a superior international status. New evidence from Germany and South Korea shows only policymakers who acknowledge this higher rank of the United States, and hence view their own nation as inferior, respond to this social pressure by obeying the US demand for a nuclear reversal.

摘要

本文探讨了美国同盟的扩散抑制作用。有关美国盟国核倒退的现有解释要么集中在确保联盟提供担保，要么集中在美国被遗弃的威胁。但是，这两种模式都无法解释盟国领导人不同意撤消决定的事实。而且，盟友是否同意或拒绝核约束取决于哪个决策者承担了这一天以及外部因素。为了解释为什么某些决策者接受而其他决策者拒绝核逆转，我借鉴了美国同盟的心理方面：美国作为拥有优越国际地位的盟友的要求所固有的社会压力。来自德国和韩国的新证据表明，只有决策者承认美国的地位较高，