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Incentivizing provision of collective goods: Allocation rules
Southern Economic Journal ( IF 1.333 ) Pub Date : 2021-02-09 , DOI: 10.1002/soej.12487
Brock V. Stoddard 1 , Caleb A. Cox 2 , James M. Walker 3
Affiliation  

In a laboratory experiment, we study the voluntary provision of a divisible collective good. Allocations of the collective good to group members are determined by a third party “allocator” who benefits from increased provision of the collective good, but is rewarded externally. The allocator may resolve the free‐rider problem inherent in provision by assigning shares of the collective good to incentivize cooperation. The flexibility in allocations available to the allocator is varied across three treatment conditions. The highest level of collective good provision is observed within some groups in the mechanism that allows the allocator the greatest flexibility. However, greater flexibility comes at the cost of higher variance in allocation decisions by some allocators, leading to lower levels of provision in some groups.

中文翻译:

激励集体货物的提供:分配规则

在实验室实验中,我们研究了可分割集体货物的自愿提供。将集体物品分配给组成员是由第三方“分配者”决定的,该分配者受益于集体物品供应的增加,但会从外部获得奖励​​。分配者可以通过分配集体物品的份额来激励合作,从而解决供应中固有的搭便车问题。可分配给分配器的分配灵活性在三种处理条件之间有所不同。在该机制的某些组中观察到最高水平的集体商品提供,该机制使分配者具有最大的灵活性。但是,更大的灵活性是以某些分配者在分配决策中存在较大差异为代价的,从而导致某些组中的拨备水平较低。
更新日期:2021-04-09
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