This paper develops a new de facto measure of central bank independence (CBI) based on two recent measures of the turnover rates of central bank governors introduced by Vuletin and Zhu (2011), complemented with measures of alliance with the government in power, captured by prior executive appointment, tribe proximity, and political party affiliation. Using 1980–2009 data from 13 countries from the CFA zone (a currency union) and 18 non-CFA countries, the new index is used to 1) examine whether CBI can help achieve price stability in Africa and 2) show how CBI affects African countries that are part of a monetary union. We find that higher turnover rates lead to higher inflation. Our results are robust to the decomposition of the turnover rates into premature removals and ally replacements. Furthermore, we find that for CFA zone countries, central bank autonomy has no effect on inflation and instead inflation is driven by other variables such as the fixed exchange rate regime or commodity price shocks.

本文基于 Vuletin 和 Zhu (2011) 引入的两项央行行长更替率的最新措施，并辅以与当权政府结盟的措施，开发了一种新的事实上的央行独立性 (CBI) 措施。先前的行政任命、部落接近度和政党隶属关系。使用来自 CFA 区（货币联盟）的 13 个国家和 18 个非 CFA 国家的 1980-2009 年数据，新指数用于 1）检查 CBI 是否有助于实现非洲的价格稳定和 2）显示 CBI 如何影响非洲属于货币联盟一部分的国家。我们发现更高的周转率会导致更高的通货膨胀。我们的结果对于将周转率分解为过早移除和盟友替换是稳健的。此外，我们发现对于 CFA 区国家，