Hardware implementations of cryptosystems are susceptible to fault attacks. By analyzing the side channel information from implementation, the attacker can retrieve the secret information. Generally, in the hardware implementations, validations of results are reported at the end of the computation. If faults are injected at the input side of computation, all the computations performed afterward are wasteful and this is a potential situation which can leak the secret key information using side channel attacks. The current work proposes fault attack resistant implementation of an elliptic curve cryptosystem using a shared point validator unit, zero-one detector, and double coherence check by modified Montgomery Powering Ladder Algorithm. The architecture is robust to fault attacks along with power and area efficiency.

密码系统的硬件实现容易受到故障攻击。通过分析实现中的辅助信道信息，攻击者可以检索秘密信息。通常，在硬件实现中，结果验证在计算结束时报告。如果在计算的输入端注入了错误，则此后执行的所有计算都是浪费的，这是一种潜在的情况，可能会通过使用边信道攻击来泄漏密钥信息。当前的工作提出了一个椭圆曲线密码系统的抗故障攻击实现，该系统使用共享点验证器单元，零一检测器和改进的蒙哥马利功率阶梯算法进行双相干性检查。该体系结构对故障攻击以及功率和区域效率都具有鲁棒性。