ABSTRACT Spiritual trial is indeed ‘spiritual’ – it is possible only in someone who is not utterly spiritless as Kierkegaard means the word – but it is not true, as Kierkegaard’s pseudonyms occasionally maintain, that it makes sense only as a religious category, unless religious is redefined in radically general terms, as Kierkegaard in fact does, along with the ideas of offense, anxiety, inwardness, and desire. Every existing individual has some minimal acquaintance with spiritual trial, if only as an anxiety about a continual imminent possibility. I argue that spiritual trial, as Kierkegaard and his pseudonyms intend it – although they do not of course put it in these Levinasian terms – is inseparable from a certain phenomenology of the subject that begins with Kierkegaard and that turns spiritual trial into something essential to becoming a self, the result of one’s vulnerability to alterity, one’s anxiety to defend one’s autonomy against the experience of the other as other. Spiritual trial, in Kierkegaard’s strict sense, is therefore best understood as a special form of a very ordinary, basic experience, a kind of primordial trauma, of which Emmanuel Levinas has so far given us the most complete phenomenological description.

中文翻译：

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Kierkegaard的精神审判：宗教焦虑和列维纳斯的另一个

摘要精神审判的确是“精神上的” –可能只有在一个完全没有精神的人中，如基尔凯郭尔（Kierkegaard）所指的单词一样–但事实并非如此，正如基尔凯郭尔的化名有时保持的那样，除非宗教信仰，否则它仅作为宗教范畴才有意义正如基尔凯郭尔（Kierkegaard）所做的那样，从根本上重新定义了名词，以及进攻，焦虑，内向和欲望的观念。每个现存的人对精神试验的了解都很少，只要只是对持续迫在眉睫的可能性感到焦虑。我认为属灵的审判 正如基尔凯郭尔和他的化名所希望的那样（尽管他们当然没有用这些列维纳斯语来表达），这与基尔凯郭尔开始的主题的某种现象学是分不开的，后者将精神试验变成了成为自我必不可少的东西，这是一个人容易遭受改变，一个人渴望捍卫自己的自主权，以对抗他人的经历。因此，从克尔凯郭尔的严格意义上讲，精神审判最好理解为一种非常普通的基本经验的一种特殊形式，是一种原始的创伤，迄今为止，伊曼纽尔·列维纳斯已经向我们提供了最完整的现象学描述。