ABSTRACT This paper draws out from Kierkegaard’s work a distinctive critical perspective on an influential contemporary approach in moral philosophy: namely, Christine Korsgaard’s transcendental argument for the value of humanity. From Kierkegaard’s perspective, we argue, Korsgaard argument goes too far, in attributing absolute value to humanity – but also that she is required to make this claim if her transcendental argument is to work. From a Kierkegaardian perspective, to place this sort of value in humanity is problematic since it threatens to make the relation between individuals too claustrophobic. Finally, we explore the possibility of a rival approach, in which we should view others as ethically significant because they too are related to the kind of ‘third’ which Kierkegaard argues is needed to bring stability to the structure of the self. In this way, we claim, a different and more successful transcendental argument to the value of humanity can be found in the work of Kierkegaard.

中文翻译：

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珍视人类：克尔凯郭尔式对科尔斯高德先验论证的担忧

摘要本文从基尔凯郭尔的著作中引出了一种独特的批判性观点，探讨了一种有影响力的当代道德哲学方法：即克里斯汀·科尔斯加德关于人类价值的先验论证。从基尔凯郭尔的角度来看，我们认为，科尔斯嘉德的论点在将绝对价值​​归因于人类方面太过分了-而且，如果她的先验论据行之有效，她也必须提出这一主张。从克尔凯郭尔主义的角度来看，将这种价值置于人类中是有问题的，因为它有可能使个人之间的关系变得幽闭恐怖。最后，我们探讨了一种竞争性方法的可能性，在这种方法中，我们应将他人视为具有伦理意义的方法，因为它们也与基尔凯郭尔认为为使自我结构保持稳定所必需的“第三者”有关。