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What can Socratic philosophy achieve? Plato’s conception of care in the light of Christine Korsgaard’s self-constitution
International Journal of Philosophy and Theology Pub Date : 2020-05-26 , DOI: 10.1080/21692327.2020.1716833
Morten Sørensen Thaning 1 , Johan Gersel 1
Affiliation  

ABSTRACT Can rational arguments convince a person to change from a commitment to living an unvirtuous life into striving after virtue? Or can rationality, even in the best cases, only help preserve an already existing commitment to virtue? Our paper throws light on this question through a discussion of the form of care for the self that Plato thinks is practiced through the engagement in Socratic philosophy, the practice of giving and asking for reasons. First, the Platonic conception of the soul as the object of care is described. Secondly, we consider what care of the soul is meant to accomplish. Thirdly, we consider the pedagogical role that can be attributed to Socratic philosophy in stimulating such care. This is discussed through a critical analysis of Christine Korsgaard’s interpretation of Plato which we draw upon in our previous reconstruction. The conclusion is that the engagement in rational discourse can at best function as a way of preserving the virtue of already virtuous souls, and not as a way of transforming the unvirtuous by rationally motivating them to pursue virtue for its own sake.

中文翻译:

苏格拉底哲学可以实现什么?柏拉图根据克里斯汀·科尔斯加德的自我宪法的照料概念

摘要理性的论点可以说服一个人从承诺转为过着无害的生活,转而追求美德吗?还是即使在最好的情况下,理性也只能帮助保持对德行的承诺?我们的论文通过讨论柏拉图认为的自我关爱形式来阐明这个问题,柏拉图认为这种自我关怀是通过参与苏格拉底哲学,给予和要求理由的实践来实践的。首先,描述了柏拉图式的灵魂作为关怀的对象。其次,我们考虑对灵魂的关怀意味着什么。第三,我们认为苏格拉底哲学在促进这种关怀中的教学作用。通过对克里斯汀·科尔斯加德(Christine Korsgaard)对柏拉图的解释进行批判性分析来讨论这一点,我们在先前的重建中就借鉴了这一点。结论是,参与理性话语充其量只能作为一种维持已经有德性的人的美德的方式,而不是通过理性地激励他们为自己的美德而追求无德者的方式。
更新日期:2020-05-26
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