ABSTRACT Commentators have generally seen the compassionate person as a second-rate character vis-à-vis the ascetic ‘saint’ who denies the will-to-life and resigns from willing altogether in Schopenhauer's ethical thought. In this paper I offer another way to interpret Schopenhauer’s ethics of compassion, which is textually grounded and genuinely Schopenhauerian, but which draws out similarities to Kant’s ethics that, I shall argue, have not been hitherto appreciated. Once these Kantian similarities are appreciated one sees that the compassionate person is no longer a runner up ethically and epistemically to the saint, rather, the compassionate person and the saint are at odds with each other, and really represent – unbeknownst to Schopenhauer himself–two distinct and incompatible ethical ideals. To motivate this interpretation, I will first delineate the traditional interpretation of what Schopenhauer means by the compassionate person’s intuitive insight into the way the world really is. Second, I will offer a novel, and to my mind, textually preferable reading of what this intuitive insight consists in. Finally, I’ll suggest in light of recent work in metaethics by Colin Marshall – notably in his 2018 book titled Compassionate Moral Realism–that my interpretation of Schopenhauer’s ethics offers a creditable moral realist option for the contemporary landscape.

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叔本华是康德伦理学家吗？

摘要 评论家们普遍认为，与叔本华伦理思想中否认生命意志并完全放弃意愿的苦行“圣人”相比，富有同情心的人是二流人物。在这篇论文中，我提供了另一种解释叔本华的同情伦理学的方法，它有文字基础并且是真正的叔本华式的，但它与康德的伦理学有相似之处，我将论证说，这些相似之处我认为是迄今为止还没有被重视的。一旦理解了这些康德式的相似之处，人们就会发现，慈悲的人在伦理和认识上不再是圣人的亚军，相反，慈悲的人和圣人彼此矛盾，真正代表了——叔本华自己不知道的——两个不同的和不相容的道德理想。为了激发这种解释，我将首先描述叔本华的传统解释，即富有同情心的人对世界真实情况的直觉洞察力。其次，我将提供一本小说，在我看来，对这种直觉洞察所包含的内容的文本更可取。最后，我将根据科林·马歇尔最近在元伦理学方面的工作提出建议——特别是在他 2018 年出版的名为“同情的道德现实主义”的书中——我对叔本华伦理学的解释为当代景观提供了一个值得信赖的道德现实主义选择。