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Incentives for labour-augmenting innovations in vertical markets: The role of wage rate
International Journal of Industrial Organization ( IF 1.739 ) Pub Date : 2021-02-08 , DOI: 10.1016/j.ijindorg.2021.102715
Luca Sandrini

This article analyses the link between the wage rate and the incentives to develop and adopt a labour-augmenting innovation in a vertical market. In a model where an upstream monopolist sells the innovation to several downstream manufacturers, I show that the wage rate affects the incentives to innovate in different ways depending on i) the initial level of wage and ii) the timing of the policy’s implementation. Moreover, if the policy is introduced when the size and the price of innovation are common knowledge, then the policy-maker can elicit her preferred equilibrium by nudging more firms to adopt the technology. Instead, if the policy is introduced before the investment stage, then the increase of the wage rate generates two opposite effects: a positive cost-reducing effect and a negative output-contraction effect. If and only if the wage level is below a critical threshold, the former dominates the latter. I argue that, under certain conditions, a policy that raises the price of labour may be beneficial for both the incentives to invest in labour-augmenting innovation and the industry outcomes.



中文翻译:

垂直市场中促进劳动力创新的激励措施:工资率的作用

本文分析了工资率与激励措施之间的联系,这些激励措施是在垂直市场上发展和采用增加劳动力的创新。在一个上游垄断者将创新产品卖给数家下游制造商的模型中,我证明了工资率会以不同的方式影响创新的动机,这取决于i)初始工资水平和ii)政策实施的时机。此外,如果在创新的规模和价格是公知常识的情况下引入该政策,则决策者可以通过促使更多的公司采用该技术来激发她的偏好均衡。相反,如果在投资阶段之前引入该政策,那么工资率的提高会产生两个相反的效果:积极的降低成本效果和消极的产出收缩效果。当且仅当工资水平低于关键阈值时,前者才占主导地位。我认为,在一定条件下,提高劳动力价格的政策可能既有利于对增加劳动力的创新进行投资的激励措施,也有利于行业成果。

更新日期:2021-02-16
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