Prior empirical research investigating the relationship between chief executive officer (CEO) tenure and firms’ financial performance has shown inconclusive results. Based on arguments of agency and behavioral agency theories, we suggest that this relationship is nuanced and may vary depending on CEO pay and board monitoring. In response to these arguments, we meta-analytically test 385 studies (n = 1,029,602). We find that CEO tenure is positively related to firms’ financial performance. This positive relationship is enhanced when CEOs receive higher cash compensation or hold more stock ownership. On the other hand, the above positive relationship becomes weaker when CEOs receive higher long-term incentives or when the firm has more independent board directors. These findings suggest that CEO pay and board monitoring, or agency mechanisms in general, can offer new research avenues to help explore boundary conditions of the CEO tenure and firms’ financial performance relationship.

先前的调查研究首席执行官（CEO）任期与公司财务绩效之间关系的实证研究未得出结论。基于代理和行为代理理论的论据，我们建议这种关系是细微的，并且可能取决于首席执行官的薪酬和董事会监督而有所不同。针对这些论点，我们对385项研究进行了元分析测试（n= 1,029,602）。我们发现首席执行官的任期与公司的财务绩效呈正相关。当首席执行官获得更高的现金报酬或持有更多的股票时，这种积极的关系就会增强。另一方面，当首席执行官获得更高的长期激励或公司拥有更多独立董事时，上述积极关系就会减弱。这些发现表明，CEO薪酬和董事会监督或总体上的代理机制可以提供新的研究途径，以帮助探索CEO任期和企业财务绩效关系的边界条件。