A critical assessment of Merleau-Ponty’s conception of phenomenology highlights singular differences between Husserl’s phenomenological methodology and existential analysis, between epistemology and ontology, and between essential and individualistic perspectives. When we duly follow the rigorous phenomenological methodology described by Husserl, we are confronted with the challenge of making the familiar strange and with the challenge of languaging experience. In making the familiar strange, we do not immediately have words to describe what is present, but must let the experience of the strange resonate for some time, and even then, must return to it many times over to pinpoint its aspects, character, or quality in descriptively exacting ways. Moreover as Husserl points out, language can seduce us into thinking we know when we do not know. The methodology thus highlights the import of being true to the truths of experience, and in doing so, authenticates the basic value of a phenomenological methodology to the human sciences.

中文翻译：

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赞美现象学

对Merleau-Ponty现象学概念的批判性评估突显了胡塞尔的现象学方法论与存在分析，认识论与本体论之间以及本质与个人主义观点之间的独特差异。当我们适当地遵循胡塞尔描述的严格的现象学方法论时，我们将面临使熟悉的事物变得陌生和语言经验的挑战。在使熟悉的事物变得陌生时，我们没有立即用言语来描述存在的事物，而是必须让陌生人的经历在一段时间内引起共鸣，即使如此，也必须多次回到陌生人身上，以查明事物的外观，特征或以描述性的方式保证质量。而且，正如胡塞尔指出的那样，语言可以诱使我们思考我们何时不知道的知识。