In an attempt to illuminate the relevance of philosophical thought, this topical issue of Open Philosophy discusses the meaning of experience. Experience is usually considered a mental act that results in knowledge. In German and Danish, someone macht or gør (‘makes’ or ‘does’) an experience, which clearly reflects the view that the verb ‘to experience’ denotes a mental act. In English, the person has an experience, which similarly implies that the experience is a property acquired through an act performed by the individual having the experience. This notion of experience as a mental act is problematic as it prevents us from surpassing the splitting of subject and object that bedevils modern minds. The widespread tendency to regard subject and object as essentially separate makes it difficult to grasp the impressions of wholeness and connectedness that even nowadays are familiar to many people. Once experience is understood merely as a mental act we cannot formulate concepts of experience that are meaningful to people who know instances of profound movement that are not initiated and controlled by themselves, but which are productive of crucial insight. Regarded as mental acts, such experiences are judged devoid of truth no matter how obvious their existential importance appear to be. This topical issue of Open Philosophy is therefore devoted to the question of how we can develop our understanding of experience by surpassing the established subject-object paradigm and by desisting to view experience as a mental act. This probes the potential implications of such development for the undertaking of philosophical thought and the analysis of contemporary cultural and social phenomena. In Aristotle’s On the Soul, experience is identical to perception, but the word ‘perception,’ or in Greek aisthesis, encompasses more than it tends to do in our time. Whereas we usually identify perception with sense perception, the aisthesis described in On the Soul is both sensory and emotional. Alexander Gottlieb Baumgarten’s introduction of philosophical aesthetics in the 18th century was based on this width of the Greek notion of perception.1 In the first paragraph of his Aesthetica, Baumgarten describes aesthetics as the philosophy of cognitio sensitiva, that is, sensitive cognition. Baumgarten’s statement refers to his understanding of aesthetics as the philosophy of aistheta (perceptions), not noeta (concepts), and his recognition of aistheta as providers of an autonomous kind of cognition that is different from the logical cognition provided by noeta. Moreover, the truth that Baumgarten ascribes to sensitive cognition precisely relies on the not only sensory but also emotional quality ascribed to aisthesis by Aristotle. At the end of the 20th century, Baumgarten’s aesthetics was subject to renewed interest, and in 2007, Felix Meiner Verlag released the first full translation of Aesthetica into German. In recent decades, Baumgarten’s aesthetics has been subject to studies, reinterpretations, and developments conducted by German, Danish, and Italian scholars in particular. Nevertheless, many contemporary scholars still misinterpret Baumgarten’s concept of sensitive cognition as a concept of sensory rather than sensitive cognition, which results in a reproduction of the dualism between sensory empirical experience and rational logical cognition that dominated the rationalism and empiricism of the 17th and 18th centuries, a dualism that is still dominant but from which Baumgarten’s aesthetics departed.2

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主题问题“新钥匙体验”的社论介绍

为了阐明哲学思想的相关性，本期开放哲学专题讨论了经验的含义。经验通常被认为是导致知识的精神行为。在德语和丹麦语中，某人可能会做出某种体验（“使”或“确实”），这清楚地反映了这样一种观点，即“经历”动词表示一种心理行为。用英语来说，该人具有一种经历，这类似地暗示该经历是通过具有该经历的个人的行为而获得的财产。这种作为一种精神行为的经验概念是有问题的，因为它阻止我们超越困扰现代思想的主体和客体的分裂。人们普遍认为，主体和客体本质上是分离的，这使得很难把握甚至当今许多人都熟悉的整体性和联系性的印象。一旦将经验仅理解为一种心理行为，我们就无法制定对那些不了解深层动作实例的人有意义的经验概念，这些实例并非由自己发起和控制，而是能产生重要的见解。被视为精神行为的此类经验，无论其存在的重要性看起来多么明显，都被判断为没有事实。因此，本期开放哲学专题讨论了一个问题，即我们如何通过超越既定的主客范式并坚持将经验视为一种心理行为，来发展对经验的理解。这探讨了这种发展对哲学思想的承接以及对当代文化和社会现象的分析的潜在含义。在亚里士多德的《灵魂》中，经验与感知是相同的，但是“感知”一词（在希腊美学中）所包含的意义远不及我们时代。尽管我们通常将感知与感官识别相结合，但《灵魂上的灵魂》中描述的麻醉既是感官上也是情感上。亚历山大·戈特利布·鲍姆加滕（Alexander Gottlieb Baumgarten）在18世纪对哲学美学的介绍是基于希腊知觉的这一宽度。1鲍姆加滕（Baumgarten）在其美学的第一段中将美学描述为敏感性认知的哲学，即敏感性认知。鲍姆加滕（Baumgarten）的陈述将他对美学的理解理解为是aistheta（感知）而非哲学（noeta）（概念）的哲学，以及他对aistheta的认可是一种自主的，与noeta提供的逻辑认知不同的认知的提供者。此外，鲍姆加滕（Baumgarten）归因于敏感认知的事实不仅依赖于亚里斯多德（Aristotle）归因于麻醉的感觉和情感素质。20世纪末，Baumgarten的美学受到了新的关注，并在2007年，Felix Meiner Verlag发行了第一本将Aesthetica完整译成德语的作品。近几十年来，鲍姆加滕的美学一直受到德国，丹麦和意大利学者的研究，重新诠释和发展。不过，