Abstract In his Prince of Networks, Graham Harman reconstructs Latourian critique of concepts of potentiality and virtuality with which he claims to agree. This seems striking because Latour’s arguments seem to be exactly those Harman rejects in his other writings as overmining. Furthermore, this critique of potentiality and virtuality creates a dividing line between Harman and Bryant’s Democracy of Objects, where the concept of virtual plays a central role. In this article, I will explore this debate, focusing on how the concept of virtuality works in the context of the ontological realism that Object-Oriented Ontology is. To do this, I will first present Bryant’s notion of virtuality focusing on the problem of the individuality of the object. Then I will explore Latourian–Harmanian arguments against virtuality and show that the main issue Harman has with virtuality has to do with the agency of objects. Therefore, I claim that the main dividing line between Bryant’s and Harman’s versions of Object-Oriented Ontology is the difference between the two notions of agency.

中文翻译：

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面向对象本体中的虚拟性与代理问题

摘要格雷厄姆·哈曼（Graham Harman）在他的《网络王子》中重构了拉图里亚对潜力和虚拟性概念的批判，他声称对此表示赞同。这似乎是惊人的，因为拉图尔的论点似乎恰好是哈曼在他其他著作中所否认的过分论点。此外，对潜力和虚拟性的这种批判在哈曼和科比的“物体民主”之间建立了分界线，其中虚拟概念起着核心作用。在本文中，我将探讨这场辩论，重点是虚拟概念如何在面向对象本体论的本体论现实主义背景下发挥作用。为此，我将首先介绍科比的虚拟性概念，重点是物体的个性化问题。然后，我将探讨拉图尔安-哈曼主义对虚拟性的争论，并表明哈曼对虚拟性的主要问题与物体的代理有关。因此，我认为科比和哈曼的面向对象本体论之间的主要区别是代理的两个概念之间的区别。