Abstract Some variants of Object-Oriented Ontology define entities in terms of their powers. Such variants are rooted in Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari’s theory of “machinic assemblages”. This article asks whether such entities can be metaphysical primitives with regard to similarity and change. This is the case if no further existents are needed to account for these two features of reality. According to Levi Bryant’s machine-oriented ontology, entities defined in terms of powers are such primitives. According to Manuel DeLanda’s assemblage theory, they are not. DeLanda therefore holds that further metaphysical primitives must exist. After reconstructing the key features of the theories involved, I argue that Bryant’s position is ultimately more parsimonious, and that DeLanda’s theory confuses epistemological models with ontological realities.

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形而上学的原始：德勒兹，德兰达和科比的机器和组合

摘要面向对象本体的某些变体根据其能力来定义实体。此类变体源自Gilles Deleuze和FélixGuattari的“机器组合”理论。本文问这些实体在相似性和变化方面是否可以是形而上学的原语。如果不需要进一步的存在来说明现实的这两个特征，就是这种情况。根据李维·布莱恩特（Levi Bryant）的面向机器的本体论，按照权力定义的实体就是这样的原语。根据Manuel DeLanda的组合理论，它们不是。因此，德兰达认为必须存在进一步的形而上学原语。在重构了所涉及理论的关键特征之后，我认为科比的立场最终将变得更加简约，而德兰达的理论将认识论模型与本体论现实相混淆。