ABSTRACT An important challenge for non-naturalistic moral realism is that it seems hard to reconcile it with the (purported) fact of our reliability in forming correct moral beliefs. Some philosophers (including Cuneo and Shafer-Landau) have argued that we can appeal to conceptual truths about our moral concepts in order to respond to this challenge. Call this “the conceptual strategy”. The conceptual strategy faces a problem: it isn’t clear that the relevant moral concepts are “extension-revealing” in the way that the conceptual strategy needs them to be. A further problem stems from the tradeoff between the “extension-revealing” and the “authority-revealing” aspects of normative concepts. To underscore the import of these issues, I discuss a version of the reliability challenge that concerns authoritative normative facts in ethics (rather than moral facts). The problems I identify for the conceptual strategy carry over to versions of it that are used in response to a range of epistemological arguments in ethics that (like the reliability challenge) are tied to Street’s “Darwinian Dilemma” argument. These problems also bear on the prospects of the conceptual strategy for explaining our (purported) reliability in other domains (e.g., in epistemology, law, and politics).

中文翻译：

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关于权威规范性的概念真理、演变和可靠性

摘要 非自然主义道德现实主义的一个重要挑战是，它似乎很难与我们在形成正确的道德信念方面的可靠性（声称的）事实相协调。一些哲学家（包括 Cuneo 和 Shafer-Landau）认为，我们可以诉诸关于我们的道德概念的概念真理，以应对这一挑战。称之为“概念策略”。概念策略面临一个问题：不清楚相关的道德概念是否以概念策略需要的方式“扩展揭示”。另一个问题源于规范概念的“扩展揭示”和“权威揭示”方面之间的权衡。为了强调这些问题的重要性，我讨论了可靠性挑战的一个版本，它涉及伦理中的权威规范事实（而不是道德事实）。我为概念策略确定的问题延续到它的版本，这些版本用于回应伦理学中的一系列认识论论点（如可靠性挑战）与 Street 的“达尔文困境”论点有关。这些问题也与解释我们在其他领域（例如，认识论、法律和政治）中（声称的）可靠性的概念策略的前景有关。