ABSTRACT rights is a normative concept. This gives rise to three desiderata for conceptualising rights: first, given the wide variety of contexts in which rights are invoked, an account of rights must be suitably general; second, since deploying the concept of rights involves making normative judgments, the account must explain how the concept is action guiding. At the same time, in light of moral disagreement and value pluralism, an account of rights cannot tell us which rights we have. The account must hence identify the types of normative judgments involved in the deployment of rights and, at the same time, make room for ethical disagreement about the content of specific rights. The article proposes an account of rights that meets these criteria. The model comprises three dimensions: constraint, value, and the right’s relational context. It allows us to understand disagreements about rights as substantive normative ones rather than as conceptual misunderstandings.

中文翻译：

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三个维度的思考：将权利理论化为规范性概念

摘要权利是一个规范性概念。这就产生了对权利进行概念化的三个必要条件：第一，考虑到权利被援引的广泛背景，对权利的描述必须具有适当的概括性；其次，由于运用权利概念涉及做出规范性判断，因此说明必须解释该概念如何指导行动。同时，鉴于道德分歧和价值多元化，对权利的解释无法告诉我们我们拥有哪些权利。因此，说明必须确定涉及权利部署的规范判断的类型，同时，为特定权利内容的伦理分歧留出空间。这篇文章提出了一个符合这些标准的权利说明。该模型包括三个维度：约束、价值和权利的关系背景。