ABSTRACT Some commentators recognise a distinction between policy and principle and regard private law as exclusively a matter of principle. Variants of this approach are found in Dworkin and corrective justice and ‘rights’ theorists. For these commentators, the distinction is fundamental to the character of private law, and to its development through the common law. Other commentators, in particular proponents of policy-oriented accounts, including the economic analysis of law, deny that there is any basis for such a distinction. I discuss in outline some of the attractions and difficulties of these approaches, and I set out a version of the principle/policy distinction in terms of the ‘standpoint limitation’, which I argue determines the character of private law. I consider how the standpoint limitation gives rise to the characteristic structural features of private law, focussing on contract and negligence in tort. I also show how, on one approach to the common law, the standpoint limitation is implicit in ordinary common law reasoning.

中文翻译：

---

政策和原则以及私法的特征

摘要 一些评论家承认政策和原则之间的区别，并认为私法完全是一个原则问题。这种方法的变体可以在德沃金和矫正正义和“权利”理论家中找到。对于这些评论家来说，这种区别对于私法的特征及其通过普通法的发展至关重要。其他评论者，特别是政策导向账户的支持者，包括法律的经济分析，否认这种区分有任何基础。我概述了这些方法的一些吸引力和困难，并根据“立场限制”阐述了原则/政策区别的一个版本，我认为它决定了私法的特征。我考虑立场限制如何产生私法的特征结构特征，重点关注侵权行为中的合同和过失。我还展示了，在普通法的一种方法中，立场限制是如何隐含在普通普通法推理中的。