ABSTRACT We discuss the 1818 case in which the jury sided with inspector J. Maurice, who had demanded payment for inspecting casks of whale oil. The verdict is arguably incorrect: as several experts argued, whales are not fish. However, a well-established use of ‘fish’ at the time included whales. The jury relied on that meaning. Arguably, the verdict was also correct. Both responses are intrinsically plausible, albeit contradictory. It is often argued that the issue in this case is not about semantics, but about how content is determined by features of legal communication. Some authors try to elucidate how the content of legal texts is determined by pragmatic features. Others consider that there is always a gap between the content communicated by an act of legislation and its legal impact. Both positions try to assess whether the verdict of the jury was right. Here we will not adjudicate, nor will we try to provide an answer by determining the correct meaning of ‘fish’. Our purpose is to understand the tension raised by the case. We claim that semantic and meta-semantic considerations are essential, and we propose two models that clarify the nature of the tension.

中文翻译：

---

关于鲸鱼和鱼。两种解释模式

摘要 我们讨论了 1818 年的案件，在该案件中，陪审团站在检查员 J. Maurice 一边，后者要求支付检查鲸油桶的费用。这个判决可以说是不正确的：正如几位专家所说，鲸鱼不是鱼。然而，当时“鱼”的成熟用法包括鲸鱼。陪审团依赖于这个意思。可以说，判决也是正确的。两种反应本质上都是合理的，尽管相互矛盾。人们经常争辩说，这种情况下的问题不在于语义，而在于内容是如何由法律传播的特征决定的。一些作者试图阐明法律文本的内容是如何由语用特征决定的。其他人认为，立法行为传达的内容与其法律影响之间总是存在差距。两种立场都试图评估陪审团的裁决是否正确。在这里，我们不会评判，也不会试图通过确定“鱼”的正确含义来提供答案。我们的目的是了解案件引发的紧张局势。我们声称语义和元语义考虑是必不可少的，我们提出了两个模型来阐明紧张的性质。