ABSTRACT Highlighting the relations between De Anima II.5 and De Anima III.4, this paper argues that Aristotle held a surprisingly dynamic view of the intellect. According to this view, the intellect is in a constant development brought about by its own activity. This dynamic view distinguishes the intellect from both physical objects and from sense-perception. For Aristotle the intellect is a “nothing” that gradually becomes something by thinking. The paper traces the logic of this idea and its meaning. It defends the simple thesis that in the intellect alone first and second transitions are bound together: that every concrete thought is also a determination of the possibility of the intellect. This, I will suggest, was known to ancient commentators who distinguished between not two but three “intellects” in De Anima; not only the possible and actual intellects, but also the acquired intellect. It is the unique conceptual structure of the acquired intellect that this paper sketches.

中文翻译：

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自形成容器：亚里斯多德，可塑性和智力的发展性

摘要本文着重强调了《阿尼玛二世》 5.De和《阿尼玛三世》 4.之间的关系，认为亚里士多德对智力有着令人惊讶的动态看法。根据这种观点，智力是由其自身活动引起的不断发展的。这种动态的观点将智力与物理对象和感官区分开。对亚里士多德而言，理智是“虚无”，通过思考逐渐变成某种东西。本文追溯了这种想法的逻辑及其含义。它捍卫了一个简单的论点，即仅在智力方面，第一和第二转换就绑定在一起：每个具体的思想也是对智力可能性的确定。我会建议，这是古代评论员所知道的，他们在德阿尼玛中不是两个而是三个“智力”。不仅可能的和实际的智力，而且还包括获得的智力。本文所描绘的是获得性智力的独特概念结构。