ABSTRACT This paper explores the structure and elements of the intentional experiences of imagining fictional objects. The author critically examines the argument that whereas Husserl’s theory of imagination cannot do justice to fictional objects, Ingarden’s theory of purely intentional objects provides a basis for the theory of intentionality that explains the status of fictional objects. The paper discusses this argument to show that it is justified only in regard to Husserl’s early account of imagination, and on the condition of understanding contents as the phantasmas. Moreover, the author sketches Ingarden’s theory of imagination, and compares it to Husserl’s later account of imagination in terms of noetic-noematic structures. Finally, the author questions the sharp distinction between Husserl and Ingarden with respect to their theories of imagination and fictional objects by showing that it is hard to classify clearly their theories as content or object theories respectively.

中文翻译：

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关于虚构物体存在的争论：胡塞尔和英加登的想象力和虚构

摘要本文探讨了想象虚构对象的有意体验的结构和要素。作者批判性地考察了以下观点：胡塞尔的想象力理论不能对虚构的事物做到正义，而英加登的纯粹有意的事物理论则为解释虚构的事物的意图性理论提供了基础。本文讨论了这一论点，以表明它仅在胡塞尔对想象力的早期描述以及将内容理解为幻象的条件下是合理的。此外，作者勾勒了英加登的想象力理论，并将其与胡塞尔后来的关于想象力-意象结构的想象力进行了比较。最后，