ABSTRACT

The phenomenological vision, particularly, Husserl’s idea of critique as an infinite vocational theoria and Patočka’s as an enduring programme, view Platonic logic and Socratic act as the paradigms for a normative justification of the idea of universal science and philosophy. In light of that, the Thrasymachus-Socrates debate is interpreted as a case to testify the critical power of philosophy successfully exercised over sophistic tyrannical non-philosophy. This paper criticizes the phenomenological idealization of the Socratic victory as an ethico-teleologically anticipated success of philosophy and rewrites the defeat of Thrasymachus as a political failure in warring with philosophy during which Thrasymachus questions the legitimacy of the act of philosophizing to decide its legitimacy and thereby exposes the politics played out in that act.

摘要

现象学视角，特别是作为批判胡塞尔的想法无限的职业theoria和Patočka的作为一个持久的程序，查看柏拉图式的逻辑和苏格拉底充当了为普遍科学和哲学观念的规范性辩护提供了范式。有鉴于此，色拉叙马库斯与苏格拉底的辩论被解释为一个案例，证明哲学的批判力量成功地运用于诡辩专制的非哲学。本文批评苏格拉底胜利的现象学理想化是哲学的伦理目的论预期的成功，并将色拉叙马库斯的失败改写为与哲学交战的政治失败，在此期间色拉叙马库斯质疑哲学化行为的合法性以决定其合法性，从而决定其合法性。暴露了在该行为中发挥的政治作用。