ABSTRACT

This paper examines the evolution of Husserl’s philosophy of non-intuitive intentions. The analysis has two stages. First, I expose a mistake in Husserl’s account of non-intuitive acts from his 1901 Logical Investigations. I demonstrate that Husserl employs the term “signitive” too broadly, as he concludes that all non-intuitive acts are signitive. He states that not only meaning acts, but also the contiguity intentions of perception are signitive acts. Second, I show how Husserl, in his 1913/14 Revisions to the Sixth Logical Investigation, amends his 1901 theory of non-intuitive acts, which he now calls “empty” intentions. He there accurately distinguishes empty meaning acts from the empty intentions of perception. In the conclusion, I reveal how Husserl’s alterations to his theory of non-intuitive intentions can inform our understanding of a larger shift in his philosophy.

摘要

本文考察了胡塞尔非直觉意图哲学的演变。分析有两个阶段。首先，我从他的1901年《逻辑调查》中揭露了胡塞尔对非直觉行为的描述中的错误。我证明了胡塞尔（Husserl）过于广泛地使用了“指称”一词，因为他得出结论，所有非直觉行为都是指称的。他指出，不仅意义行为而且知觉的连续意图也是标志性行为。其次，我展示胡塞尔在他的1913/14第六次逻辑调查修订本中如何修正他的1901年非直觉行为理论，他现在将其称为“空”意图。他在那里准确地将空洞的意义行为与空洞的感知意图区分开。在结论中，我揭示了胡塞尔对他的非直觉意图理论的改变可以如何帮助我们理解他的哲学的更大转变。