ABSTRACT In The Essence of Human Freedom, Heidegger suggests that Kant’s idea of pure will and Heidegger’s own idea of resoluteness are rooted in the same experience of demand from our own essence. This experience can unfold, I argue, through twofold self-understanding: first, the primordial self-understanding on the existentiell level that results in the indefiniteness of pure will (or resoluteness), as Heidegger’s phenomenological reading of Kant (or his own existential analysis) presents; and second, the practical self-understanding on the rational level that results in the principle of morality, as Kant’s Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals demonstrates. Based on this approach, if we accept Heidegger’s phenomenological interpretation of pure will but do not follow his rejection of the categorical imperative formulas, we can achieve a Heideggerian revision of Kant’s original justification of morality while avoiding Kant’s problematic assumption that the authentic self belongs to the intelligible realm.

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海德格尔对康德实践哲学的现象学解读的伦理学教训：海德格尔对康德道德辩护的修正

摘要在《人类自由的本质》中，海德格尔指出，康德的纯粹意志观念和海德格尔自己的坚决观念都源于我们自身本质上的相同需求体验。我认为，这种经验可以通过双重自我理解来展现：首先，作为海德格尔对康德的现象学解读（或他自己的存在主义分析），在存在感层面上的原始自我理解导致纯粹意志（或坚决）的不确定性。 ）礼物；其次，正如康德的《道德形而上学基础》所证明的那样，在导致道德原则的理性层面上的实践自我理解。基于这种方法，如果我们接受海德格尔对纯意志的现象学解释，但不遵循海德格尔对绝对命令式的拒绝，