This paper examines how market frictions influence the managerial incentives and organizational structure of new hedge funds. We develop a stylized model in which new managers search for accredited investors and have stronger incentives to acquire managerial skill when encountering low investor demand. Fund families endogenously arise to mitigate frictions and weaken the performance incentives of affiliated new funds. Empirically, based on a TASS‐HFR‐BarclayHedge merged database, we find that ex ante identified cold inceptions facing low investor demand outperform existing hedge funds and hot inceptions facing high demand and that cold stand‐alone inceptions outperform all types of family‐affiliated inceptions.

中文翻译：

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对冲基金初创公司的经济学：理论和经验证据

本文研究了市场摩擦如何影响新对冲基金的管理动机和组织结构。我们开发了一种程式化的模型，在这种模型中，新经理寻找合格的投资者，并且在遇到投资者的低需求时具有更强的动机来获得管理技能。基金家族源于内生，以减轻摩擦并削弱附属新基金的绩效激励。基于TASS-HFR-BarclayHedge合并数据库的经验，我们发现事前确定了投资者需求低迷的冷门表现胜过现有对冲基金，而需求高需求的热学门槛高，而独立的冷梦之门跑赢了所有类型的家庭联属理财。 。