Chief executive officer (CEO) power reflects the ability of the CEO to influence the firm's decision-making. Whether the CEO of the firm could manage the firm’s investment assets to support maximizing the efficiency of resource allocation is an important issue. As previous studies found, organization capital is a key intangible asset that improves the firm’s production efficiency and affects long-term performance. This study explores how CEO power affects organization capital investments and how it further affects the efficiency of firm resource allocation. We use the following three variables to measure CEO power: CEO founder, CEO-only insider and CEO duality. Our results indicate that the level of CEO power can influence a firm’s value by controlling the organization capital. When the firm’s CEO is also the founder, the CEO will attempt to increase investments in organization capital to create growth opportunities for the firm, which will therefore increase the firm's value. Specifically, when the company is in financial distress, the powerful CEO's increasing in organizational capital investment will expose the company to greater risk of loss of intangible assets. This result may further increase the company's price volatility.

首席执行官（CEO）的能力反映了CEO影响公司决策的能力。公司首席执行官是否可以管理公司的投资资产以支持最大化资源分配效率是一个重要的问题。正如先前的研究发现，组织资本是一种关键的无形资产，可以提高公司的生产效率并影响长期绩效。这项研究探讨了CEO权力如何影响组织的资本投资以及它如何进一步影响公司资源分配的效率。我们使用以下三个变量来衡量CEO的能力：CEO创始人，仅CEO内部人员和CEO对偶。我们的结果表明，首席执行官权力的水平可以通过控制组织资本来影响公司的价值。当公司的首席执行官也是创始人时，首席执行官将尝试增加对组织资本的投资，从而为公司创造增长机会，从而增加公司的价值。具体而言，当公司陷入财务困境时，强有力的首席执行官在组织资本投资方面的增长将使公司面临更大的无形资产损失风险。该结果可能会进一步增加公司的价格波动性。