This paper adapts the canonical New Economic Geography model for experimental testing of the model's behavioral assumptions by developing a finite-player, finite-horizon dynamic game of migration. Our analysis gives distinctive predictions when migration is consistent with myopic behavior (MB) and when it is consistent with sequentially rational or perfect forward-looking behavior (FB). These alternatives are tested in an economic laboratory experiment with increasing number of agents in different treatments. Results show that perfect FB loses ground against MB as the number of agents and periods increases, and this number may be surprisingly small.

中文翻译：

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经济地理学中理性前瞻性行为的实验分析

本文通过开发有限参与者，有限水平的动态迁徙博弈，将规范的《新经济地理》模型改编为模型行为假设的实验测试。当迁移符合近视行为（MB）且符合顺次有理或完美的前瞻性行为（FB）时，我们的分析给出了独特的预测。这些替代方案已在经济实验室实验中进行了测试，其中越来越多的试剂采用了不同的处理方法。结果表明，随着代理数量和周期的增加，完美的FB相对于MB失去了优势，而且这个数字可能很小。