We analyze the spread of an infectious disease in a population when individuals strategically choose how much time to interact with others. Individuals are either of the severe type or of the asymptomatic type. Only severe types have symptoms when they are infected, and the asymptomatic types can be contagious without knowing it. In the absence of any symptoms, individuals do not know their type and continuously tradeoff the costs and benefits of self-isolation on the basis of their belief of being the severe type. We show that all equilibria of the game involve social interaction, and we characterize the unique equilibrium in which individuals partially self-isolate at each date. We calibrate our model to the COVID-19 pandemic and simulate the dynamics of the epidemic to illustrate the impact of some public policies.

当个人战略性地选择与他人互动的时间时，我们分析了传染病在人群中的传播。个体要么是重症型，要么是无症状型。只有重症的感染了才会有症状，无症状的可以在不知不觉中传染。在没有任何症状的情况下，个人不知道自己的类型，并根据他们认为自己是严重类型的信念不断权衡自我隔离的成本和收益。我们表明游戏的所有均衡都涉及社交互动，并且我们描述了个人在每个日期部分自我隔离的独特均衡。我们将我们的模型校准为 COVID-19 大流行并模拟流行病的动态以说明某些公共政策的影响。