The constitutional political economy (CPE) approach as developed by James Buchanan places emphasis on supermajority rules—in particular, a unanimity requirement for constitutional change. Critics argue that this approach “privileges the status quo” in two problematic ways: (1) alternatives are treated unequally, because the status quo requires a smaller coalition to be “chosen” than any other institutional arrangement selected to replace it; and (2) individuals are treated unequally, because those who happen to support the status quo have excessive power to impose their will on the larger group, implying that a minority illegitimately is privileged to block change. This is a serious and important challenge. At the same time, we argue that critics have conflated two analytically distinct issues in arguing that the CPE paradigm (and constitutionalism more generally) “privilege the status quo”. Moreover, we aim to show that in rejecting the “privileged position of the status quo”, critics must confront an equally challenging task: Providing a “measuring stick” by which the legitimacy of the status quo, and changes to it, can be judged. It is precisely skepticism regarding the possibility of providing a criterion of legitimacy that is independent of agreement that leads to the peculiar position of the status quo in Buchanan’s thought.

詹姆斯·布坎南（James Buchanan）提出的宪法政治经济学（CPE）方法强调了多数制规则，尤其是宪法变更的一致要求。批评者认为，这种方法以两种有问题的方式“使现状享有特权”：（1）替代方案受到不平等对待，因为与“选择”替代任何其他机构安排相比，“选择”现状需要较小的联盟；（2）个人受到不平等待遇，因为碰巧支持现状的人拥有将自己的意愿强加给更大群体的权力，这意味着少数人有特权非法阻止变革。这是一个严重而重要的挑战。同时，我们认为，批评者在争论CPE范式（更普遍的是宪政）“赋予现状特权”时将两个在分析上截然不同的问题混为一谈。此外，我们旨在表明，在拒绝“现状的特权地位”时，批评者必须面对同样具有挑战性的任务：提供“量尺”，通过它可以判断现状的合法性及其变化。 。对于提供合法性标准的可能性的怀疑，正是这种怀疑独立于共识，从而导致了布坎南思想中现状的特殊地位。提供一个“量尺”，通过它可以判断现状的合法性及其变化。对于提供合法性标准的可能性的怀疑，正是这种怀疑独立于共识，从而导致了布坎南思想中现状的特殊地位。提供一个“量尺”，通过它可以判断现状的合法性及其变化。对于提供合法性标准的可能性的怀疑，正是这种怀疑独立于共识，从而导致了布坎南思想中现状的特殊地位。