Government agencies are increasingly using economic incentives to encourage landowners to adopt conservation practices. Auctions enable agencies to identify land conservation practices with low opportunity costs. At the same time, landowners’ opportunity costs contain useful information for government agencies to rank conservation priorities. This paper introduces a new reverse auction mechanism that performs well both from the cost effectiveness and cost-revelation perspectives and compares three multi-award reverse auction mechanisms. The first mechanism is called the Uniform Price Reverse (UPR) auction, where each winning bidder is paid the lowest rejected bid. The second mechanism is called the First Price Reverse (FPR) auction, where winning bidders are paid their submitted bids. The third, novel, mechanism is called the Generalized Second Price Reverse (GSPR) auction, where each winning bidder is paid the bid that is immediately higher. Theoretically, I derive the equilibrium bidding strategy for each auction mechanism and show that a symmetric equilibrium strategy may not exist under the GSPR auction. Empirically, lab experiment results show that UPR and GSPR auctions lead to a higher efficiency level compared to FPR, while UPR auction yields the lowest auctioneer surplus and is the least cost effective. As a result, GSPR maintains good incentive properties similar to UPR and presents potential large cost-saving opportunities to the auctioneer.

政府机构越来越多地使用经济激励措施来鼓励土地所有者采取保护措施。拍卖使机构能够确定机会成本低的土地保护实践。同时，土地所有者的机会成本包含有用的信息，供政府机构对保护优先级进行排序。本文介绍了一种新的反向拍卖机制，该机制从成本效益和成本披露的角度来看均表现良好，并比较了三种多重奖励的反向拍卖机制。第一种机制称为统一价格逆向（UPR）拍卖，其中向每个中标者支付最低的拒绝出价。第二种机制称为第一价格反向（FPR）拍卖，向中标人支付其提交的投标。第三部小说 这种机制称为“广义第二价格逆转（GSPR）”拍卖，其中向每个中标人支付立即更高的出价。从理论上讲，我推导了每种拍卖机制的均衡竞标策略，并表明在GSPR竞标下可能不存在对称均衡策略。根据经验，实验室实验结果表明，与FPR相比，UPR和GSPR拍卖产生更高的效率水平，而UPR拍卖产生的拍卖商剩余量最低，成本效益最低。结果，GSPR保持了与UPR相似的良好激励特性，并为拍卖师提供了潜在的大量节省成本的机会。我推导了每种拍卖机制的均衡竞标策略，并表明在GSPR竞标下可能不存在对称均衡策略。根据经验，实验室实验结果表明，与FPR相比，UPR和GSPR拍卖产生更高的效率水平，而UPR拍卖产生的拍卖商剩余量最低，成本效益最低。结果，GSPR保持了与UPR相似的良好激励特性，并为拍卖师提供了潜在的大量节省成本的机会。我推导了每种拍卖机制的均衡竞标策略，并表明在GSPR竞标下可能不存在对称均衡策略。根据经验，实验室实验结果表明，与FPR相比，UPR和GSPR拍卖会带来更高的效率水平，而UPR拍卖产生的拍卖商剩余量最少，成本效益最低。结果，GSPR保持了与UPR相似的良好激励特性，并为拍卖师提供了潜在的大量节省成本的机会。