Abstract This study examined the association between intensive board monitoring (IBM) and segment disclosure quality (SDQ). It also investigated whether this association can be moderated by firm's home country investor protection (IP) level. Based on a panel of 271 non-financial European Union (EU) listed corporations covering the 2007–2012 period, this study estimated two multiple regression models including industry and year fixed effects. We found evidence that the segment disclosure quality is higher when a majority of outside directors serve on monitoring committees. We, also, found that the positive association between IBM and SDQ is more pronounced for firms in a weak IP environment and less pronounced for firms in a strong IP environment. Thus, we provided evidence in favor of a substitutive relationship between IBM and IP level with respect to their association with SDQ. Our findings are evidenced by several robustness tests.

中文翻译：

---

强化董事会监督，投资者保护和部门披露质量：来自欧盟的证据

摘要这项研究研究了密集的董事会监督（IBM）和部门披露质量（SDQ）之间的关联。它还调查了该关联是否可以由公司的母国投资者保护（IP）级别来调节。基于涵盖2007年至2012年期间的271家非金融欧盟上市公司的调查小组，本研究估算了两个多重回归模型，包括行业和年度固定效应。我们发现有证据表明，当大多数外部董事在监督委员会任职时，部门披露质量会更高。我们还发现，IBM和SDQ之间的正相关关系在IP环境较弱的公司中更为明显，而在IP环境较强的公司中则不太明显。从而，我们提供了支持IBM与IP级别之间与SDQ关联的替代关系的证据。我们的发现得到了几项鲁棒性测试的证明。