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Philosophical purpose and purposive philosophy: an interview with Nicholas Rescher
Journal of Critical Realism Pub Date : 2019-12-01 , DOI: 10.1080/14767430.2019.1695085
Nicholas Rescher 1 , Jamie Morgan 2
Affiliation  

Professor Nicholas Rescher (1928-) is an unusually prolific philosopher who has published more than 175 books between 1960 and 2016. When I first came across his work I thought that it might be the combined product of some equivalent to the Bourbaki collective – albeit one that had chosen to mysteriously locate at the University of Pittsburgh rather than Paris and was less prone to pranks. Moreover, though his oeuvre establishes him as a major systematic philosopher, his output is so diverse that this can initially be obscured. Rescher has published on almost every philosophical subject and is the originator or major proponent of several important areas of investigation. He is, amongst other things, a major proponent and developer of American pragmatism. His work draws on both idealism and realism; and makes careful distinctions regarding ontology and epistemology. He has consistently critiqued some forms of relativism, whilst positioning the scope for science, social science and ethics in ways that accommodate to, but are not restricted by, acknowledgment of objectivity, mind-independent reality, naturalism and other important issues. As such, some of the fundamental themes of his work parallel A Realist Theory of Science (Bhaskar 2008) and The Possibility of Naturalism (Bhaskar 2014). This, if nothing else, ought to encourage readers of Journal of Critical Realism to familiarize themselves with his work. Concomitantly, any social scientists interested in the work of Archer (1995), Lawson (2019), Sayer (2010), Porpora (2016) Smith (2011), Elder-Vass (2010) Norrie (2010), Norris (1996) Alston (1996) Gunnarson (2014) or Go (2019) will find Rescher’s work on specific subjects a useful companion resource. Rescher is a professional philosopher who provides concise and accessible argument and whose parsing brings clarity to many issues important in social science (truth, time and process, prediction, pluralism, complexity, method and methodology, and so forth: see, for example, Rescher 1995, 1996, 1998a, 1998b). I would suggest, however, that his work also bears reading in its own right. As a systematic philosopher, he also provides a profoundly interesting and coherent metaphysic, one that is not anti-science but rather challenges deep-seated contemporary attitudes to the pervasive capacity of science to answer all our most fundamental questions (Rescher 1984a, 2006a, 2006b, 2017, 2018a; Morgan 2019a, 2014). Again, anyone interested in Bhaskar would find instructive material in the work of Rescher. Rescher’s work has a depth and breadth that is rare amongst modern philosophers, creatively encompassing Classical

中文翻译:

哲学目的和目的哲学:尼古拉斯·雷舍(Nicholas Rescher)访谈

尼古拉斯·雷舍(Nicholas Rescher)教授(1928-)是一位异常多产的哲学家,他在1960年至2016年间出版了超过175本书。当我初次见到他的作品时,我认为这可能是与Bourbaki集体相当的作品的总合。曾经选择神秘地位于匹兹堡大学而不是巴黎的人,而且不太容易发生恶作剧。而且,尽管他的作品使他成为一位主要的系统哲学家,但他的成就却是如此多样,以至于一开始就被掩盖了。Rescher在几乎所有的哲学主题上都有发表,并且是几个重要研究领域的发起者或主要支持者。他是美国实用主义的主要支持者和发展者。他的作品既吸取了唯心主义,又吸取了现实主义。并对本体论和认识论进行仔细区分。他一直批评某些形式的相对主义,同时以适应但不限于承认客观性,独立于思想的现实,自然主义和其他重要问题的方式来定位科学,社会科学和伦理学的范围。因此,他作品的一些基本主题与《现实主义科学理论》(Bhaskar,2008年)和《自然主义的可能性》(Bhaskar,2014年)并列。如果没有其他的话,这应该鼓励《批判现实主义杂志》的读者熟悉他的作品。同时,对Archer(1995),Lawson(2019),Sayer(2010),Porpora(2016)Smith(2011),Elder-Vass(2010)Norrie(2010),Norris(1996)Alston(1996)Gunnarson(2014)或Go(2019)将发现Rescher在特定主题上的工作是有用的同伴资源。Rescher是一位专业的哲学家,他提供简洁明了的论据,并且其解析为社会科学中的许多重要问题(事实,时间和过程,预测,多元性,复杂性,方法和方法等)带来了清晰度:例如,请参阅Rescher 1995、1996、1998a,1998b)。但是,我建议,他的作品还应单独阅读。作为系统的哲学家,他还提供了一种非常有趣且连贯的形而上学,它不是反科学的,而是挑战当代对科学普遍存在的能力的深刻态度,以回答我们所有最基本的问题(Rescher 1984a,2006a,2006b ,2017,2018a; Morgan 2019a,2014)。再次,任何对Bhaskar感兴趣的人都会在Rescher的工作中找到启发性的材料。Rescher的作品具有深度和广度,这在现代哲学家中是罕见的,创造性地涵盖了古典音乐。
更新日期:2019-12-01
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