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Practical Deliberation and Background Conditions on Normative Reasons for Action
Ergo, an Open Access Journal of Philosophy Pub Date : 2018-12-11 , DOI: 10.3998/ergo.12405314.0005.032
Rachel Johnson

This paper concerns accounts of normative reasons for action that distinguish between the content of a reason and its “background conditions” (the explanation of why it is a reason). Such accounts sometimes appeal to this distinction to try to avoid what I will call “problematic thought objections”. These objections reject some accounts of normative reasons because (they claim) those accounts allow agents to have thoughts or motivations that a wellfunctioning practical reasoner ought not or cannot have (e.g., thoughts about her desires). These “problematic thoughts” concern the targeted account’s explanation of why reasons are reasons, so accounts that distinguish between reasons and background conditions can attempt to avoid these objections by claiming that thoughts about background conditions are not part of practical deliberation. I argue that this response fails because it is possible for a wellfunctioning practical reasoner’s motivation by a normative reason to include a recognition of its background conditions even if the reason itself does not. A wellfunctioning practical reasoner’s motivation by a normative reason may include motivation by the recognition that her reason (at least partially) justifies her action. This recognition may include an understanding of the background conditions on reasons. If this is right, it suggests a constraint on accounts of normative reasons: an account must be such that a practical reasoner can be moved by thought about its explanation of the nature of normative reasons without thereby becoming less wellfunctioning.

中文翻译:

规范行动理由的实际审议和背景条件

本文涉及对行为的规范性原因的说明,这些原因区分了原因的内容和其“背景条件”(原因为何的解释)。这样的叙述有时会吸引这种区别,以试图避免我称之为“问题性思维异议”。这些异议拒绝了某些规范性原因的说明,因为(他们声称)这些说明允许代理人具有功能正常的实践推理者不应该或不应该具有的思想或动机(例如,关于她的欲望的思想)。这些“问题性思维”与目标客户对原因为何的解释有关,因此区分原因和背景条件的账户可以通过声称对背景条件的思想不是实际审议的一部分来尝试避免这些反对意见。我认为这种回应是失败的,因为一个运作良好的实践推理者的动机可能会因规范性原因而包括对其背景条件的认可,即使原因本身没有。运作良好的实践推理者通过规范性理由进行的动机可能包括通过认识到动机(至少部分地)证明其行动是合理的动机。这种认识可能包括对背景条件的理解。如果这是正确的,则说明对规范性原因的解释存在限制:说明性声明必须使实际的推理者能够通过思考其对规范性原因的解释而动起来,而不会因此而变差。
更新日期:2018-12-11
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