In his Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals, Kant famously claims that it is analytic that whoever wills the end also wills the indispensably necessary means to it that is within his control. The orthodox consensus has it that the analytic proposition expresses a normative principle of practical reason. In this paper, I argue that this consensus is mistaken. On my resolute reading of Kant, he is making a descriptive point about what it is to will an end, and not making a normative claim of any sort. Kant’s argument is that when you know that some object is a necessary means to an end, you do not count as willing the end unless you also will the means, because of the distinctive content of willing: when you will an end, what you will is that you do whatever is necessary to bring about the end. I show how the resolute reading of Kant’s analytic proposition explains the possibility of hypothetical imperatives and defend the resolute reading from the charge that it makes instrumental irrationality impossible.

中文翻译：

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愿尽手段愿手段：对康德的一读

康德在《道德形而上学基础》中著名地指出，分析表明，谁愿意付出最终的代价，谁也愿意为此付出必不可少的必要手段，而这正是他所能控制的。正统共识认为，分析命题表达了实践理性的规范性原则。在本文中，我认为这种共识是错误的。在我对康德的坚决阅读中，他正在就将要达到的目的进行描述，而不是提出任何形式的规范性主张。康德的论点是，当您知道某个对象是达到目的的必要手段时，除非您也愿意该手段，否则您就不会将其视为意愿的终点，因为意愿的独特之处在于：当您达到目的时，您将会做什么？是您尽一切努力来实现目标。