This paper advances three related arguments showing that the ontic conception of explanation (OC), which is often adverted to in the mechanistic literature, is inferentially and conceptually incapacitated, and in ways that square poorly with scientific practice. Firstly, the main argument that would speak in favor of OC is invalid, and faces several objections. Secondly, OC’s superimposition of ontic explanation and singular causation leaves it unable to accommodate scientifically important explanations. Finally, attempts to salvage OC by reframing it in terms of ‘ontic constraints’ just concedes the debate to the epistemic conception of explanation. Together, these arguments indicate that the epistemic conception is more or less the only game in town.

中文翻译：

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本体解释既可以是本体的，也可以是解释性的，但不能同时存在

本文提出了三个相关的论据，这些论证表明，在机械文献中经常提到的本体论解释概念（OC）在推理和概念上均无能力，并且与科学实践相差甚远。首先，支持OC的主要论点是无效的，并面临一些异议。其次，OC的本体论解释和奇异因果关系的叠加使它无法容纳具有科学意义的解释。最后，试图通过以“本体约束”来重新定义OC来挽救OC的尝试，使辩论只停留在认知的解释性概念上。这些论点一起表明，认知概念或多或少是城里唯一的游戏。