What is it that makes a mental state conscious? Recent commentators have proposed that for Kant, consciousness results from differentiation: A mental state is conscious insofar as it is distinguished, by means of our conceptual capacities, from other states or things. I argue instead that Kant’s conception of state consciousness is sensory: A mental state is conscious insofar as it is accompanied by an inner sensation. Interpreting state consciousness as inner sensation reveals an underappreciated influence of Crusius on Kant’s view, solves some longstanding puzzles concerning Kant’s difficult doctrine of selfaffection, and sheds light on his theory of inner experience.

中文翻译：

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作为内在感觉的意识：克鲁索斯和康德

是什么使精神状态自觉？最近的评论者提出，对于康德来说，意识是由分化产生的：一种精神状态是有意识的，只要它通过我们的概念能力将其与其他状态或事物区分开。相反，我认为康德的状态意识概念是感官的：一种精神状态是有意识的，只要它伴随着一种内在的感觉。将状态意识解释为内在感觉，揭示了克鲁索斯对康德观点的理解不足，解决了关于康德艰难的自我情感学说的长期困惑，并为他的内在经验理论提供了启示。