Philosophers frequently comment on the intimate connection there is between something’s being present in perceptual experience (call this experiential presence) and that thing’s being, or at least appearing to be, temporally present (call this temporal presence). Yet, there is relatively little existing work that goes beyond asserting such a connection and instead examines its specific nature. In this paper, I suggest that we can make progress on the latter by looking at two more specific debates that have hitherto been conducted largely isolation from each other: one about the nature of conscious experience and one about the nature of time itself. The first concerns the extent to which the temporal properties of experience form an exception to the transparency of experience, meaning that introspection can provide support for one particular view of how experience itself is structured temporally; the second concerns the question as to whether there is something about experience that gives us grounds for thinking that the present is somehow metaphysically special. As I argue, the idea of a connection between experiential presence and temporal presence plays a key background role in each of these debates. Yet it can also, in each of them, be seen to draw one side towards making claims that are supposed to express an important truth but are at the same time, on the face of it, self-contradictory. In each case, resolving what it actually is that these claims are trying to get at turns on recognizing a distinctive feature of perceptual experience, which I refer to as its lack of temporal viewpointedness. Recognising this feature also helps in making sense of what the issues at stake actually are in the intuition of an intimate connection between experiential presence and temporal presence.

中文翻译：

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经验与时间：透明度与存在

哲学家经常评论说，感知体验中存在的某种事物（称为经验存在）与事物的暂时存在（或至少看起来是暂时存在）之间的密切联系。但是，现有的工作很少，除了断言这种联系之外，还可以研究其特殊性质。在本文中，我建议我们可以通过研究迄今进行的两次更具体的辩论来取得进展，这些辩论在很大程度上彼此隔离：一次涉及有意识体验的性质，另一项涉及时间本身的性质。第一个问题涉及经验的时间属性在多大程度上构成了经验透明性的例外，这意味着内省可以为经验本身如何在时间上构成的一种特定观点提供支持；第二个问题是关于经验是否存在某些问题，这使我们有理由认为现在在某种程度上在形而上学上是特殊的。正如我所论证的那样，经验存在与时间存在之间的联系这一思想在每种辩论中都起着关键的背景作用。然而，在每一个案例中，它也可以看作是提出主张的一个方面，这些主张应该表达一个重要的真理，但从表面上看，却是自相矛盾的。在每种情况下，解决这些主张的实际意图是试图轮流认识到感知经验的独特特征，我将其称为缺乏时间观点。