In "The Composition of History: a Critical Point of View of Michel Foucault's Archaeology" Javier Gálvez discusses a very specific aspect within the work of Foucault: the role of the philosophies of history in the composition of historical discourse. The philosophies of history of pre-revolutionary Europe were able to show a discursive continuity that does not tally with the discontinuities that are sought in Foucault’s archaeological and genealogical project. The question that is asked following the analyses of these discourses does not fully escape from the analyses of the knowledge-power apparatuses: how is it possible that the practical-political nature of the philosophy of history discourses has remained effectively silenced in political practice? After elucidating a barely bounded concept of “history” in Foucault from the discontinuities of the epistemological fields of “Order” and “History,” the indecision of this rupture in philosophical-historical discourse will be shown, taking Turgot and Vico as examples. Javier Gálvez Aguirre, "The Composition of History: a Critical Point of View of Michel Foucault's Archaeology" page 2 of 9 CLCWeb: Comparative Literature and Culture 20.4 (2018): Special Issue Processes of Subjectivation: Biopolitics and Politics of Literature. Ed. Azucena G. Blanco Javier Gálvez AGUIRRE The Composition of History: a Critical Point of View of Michel Foucault's Archaeology If one must speak of History with a capital “H,” this should be the History of Humanity, the History of events, the narration of singularities that enable the making of a certain story. And insofar as History can be studied, it also requires certain standards, a method, the suspicion that History and its singularities can also indicate regularities. Since The Order of Things, Foucault has expressed the interests and problems typical of undertaking any type of research concerning history. And the problem is exacerbated when imposing the obligation of examining it by means of an archaeological method: history is no longer only a temporal flow; this flow is always accompanied by a certain tinge of knowledge, a certain conception about this very history that prevents it from being thought as if there were once a pure object. Nevertheless, history, as temporality, continues to indicate, from its paradoxical position, the impulse to escape from the order of a certain knowledge. Precisely when we try to understand history from within a particular epochal frame, specifically that which emerges out of an interest in the very historicity of mankind, that is when the distinction between History and the human sciences is made more obvious. Hence it should be stated: History, in The Order of Things, cannot be included just like that as one of the human sciences. Foucault examines the question in relation to modern discourse, a discourse that aims to be dissolved in objectivity, and one to which we are still partly captive: due to the fact of having made history of the world (natural history, economic history, history of language), mankind himself becomes dehistoricized. But in this process, on setting out to find the time of things, man realizes that History concerns man exclusively, the man that designates, classifies and understands the history of things: At a very deep level, there exists a historicity of man which is itself its own history but also the radical dispersion that provides a foundation for all other histories. It was just this primary erosion that the nineteenth century sought in its concern to historicize everything, to write a general history of everything, to go back ceaselessly through time, and to place the most stable of things in the liberating stream of time. Here again, we should no doubt revise the way in which we traditionally write the history of History. (Foucault, The Order 403) From the nineteenth century onwards, interest in the human being and his history has been objectified from a paradoxical position: the particularity and relativity of actions are understood in a temporal frame, but at the same time this relativity is gradually eroded for the sake of explanatory regularity. This is a question of a feedback process: the regularities typical of a historical a priori from the classical period have lost their own specific field of enunciation. And what was typical of the classical period in terms of History? The study of regularities that are present in the objects that are analyzed. History, in the framework of the classical episteme, is Order. And it would have appeared to be that simple, if Foucault himself had not given the 1975-1976 Collège de France lectures. In these lectures, published under the title Society Must Be Defended, Foucault proposes analyzing the genealogy of the discourses on racism. This text, which does not tend to be highly cited by the specialist literature (when compared to others such as Birth of Biopolitics or Security, Territory, Population), provides the keys, as I understand it, to making another reading of Foucault possible, in which the dialogue with the tradition of the history of thought is more open. It is a text, ultimately, where the topic under discussion could also be the direct object of the history of ideas (in the sense meant by Foucault). The purpose of these lectures is to undertake an archaeological analysis of the narratives, of the (hi)stories on History up until the end of the eighteenth century. The culmination is the reabsorption of these narratives within the philosophy of bourgeois history, of that bourgeoisie that boasts about the vocabulary of Progress. It is not, therefore, a question of the praise of such absorption but the confirmation of a process of crystallization of certain discourses. Despite this assessment, the typical assertions of the philosophy of history are not the central points of the text. The critiques of a certain disciplinary notion of History are the constant background noise against which the author operates. From the methodological delimitations that are proposed in The Archaeology of Knowledge (to demarcate the elements of construction of knowledge) to the contrasting of the histories that he presents in Society Must Be Defended, Foucault delineates a conception of the least grandiloquent history, the least prone to closed systemizations and to all those characteristic products of an onto-theology (also in this case, teleological) that disregard the material practices of knowledge within which they operate. The objective is the positive establishment of (a) a series of lines of investigation for our present self-understanding, (b) alternative routes in the political construction of Javier Gálvez Aguirre, "The Composition of History: a Critical Point of View of Michel Foucault's Archaeology" page 3 of 9 CLCWeb: Comparative Literature and Culture 20.4 (2018): Special Issue Processes of Subjectivation: Biopolitics and Politics of Literature. Ed. Azucena G. Blanco ourselves. Insofar as he sets outs an alternative model of interpretation of History in toto, Foucault barely provides any indications about the future. This is not, otherwise, surprising: distancing oneself from all traditional metaphysical construction of History becomes synonymous with getting rid of the whole historical-philosophical lexicon. And this implies undermining History as such (that History with a capital “H,” lineal, with inexorable tendencies toward the western civilizing model), not offering prophetic glimmers of future hope, distrusting any anthropological projection based on technique and its (allegedly) finalistic advance. The propaedeutics of Foucault in this regard, it is worth highlighting, consist of the exposition of proto-knowledge that does not reach the disciplinary level of the most wellknown. Or, in the best of cases, a proto-knowledge that was reabsorbed into a disciplinary logic that radically modulated it. In short, it is a question of burnishing certain other discourses that have been silenced. However, this does not give them a kind of superior “moral ranking” to the predominant discourses because they are not necessarily a type of voice of the oppressed (Foucault, Society 76). It is only of use to us as an indication for undertaking a more complex critical ontology, more befitting the realities that are presented to us, albeit in a latent way, in the discourses that have remained partially crystallized down to the current day. With this condensed explanation, I have shown a possible exegetic path of the relation between the Foucauldian task and the critique of the philosophies of history, particularly those that emerged between the end of the eighteenth century and the mid-nineteenth century. In the degree to which the archaeological reading of historical knowledge (Natural History, Economics, Anthropology) opens up a breach at the heart of modern History, the philosophical constructions on History enter a critical situation: there is no question of speaking of teleology, or of truth in History, or of unidirectional lineality, or of laws in its movement, or of Progress. All construction on History of a philosophical nature has been gigantomachy, a meta-story that should be called into question due to its tendency to establish a dialectic between History and Knowledge that ideologically distorts all bourgeois action, all modern sovereign power, in a desire for universality. Thus, critiquing the modern construction of history does not imply eradicating the possibility of establishing a rational and critical investigation of its very history, of its very construction (Paponi 26). Insofar as narrative constructions of events aim to have a status of “knowing,” of “conceptual seriousness,” the focus of the question will be politicized. The narrative will go from being “literature of leisure” or “indicator of moral behavior” to being

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历史的构成：米歇尔·福柯考古学的批判观点

哈维尔·加尔维兹（JavierGálvez）在“历史构成：米歇尔·福柯的考古学的批判性观点”中讨论了福柯作品中的一个非常具体的方面：历史哲学在历史话语构成中的作用。革命前欧洲的历史哲学能够显示出一种话语连续性，而这种连续性与福柯的考古和家谱研究中所寻求的不连续性相吻合。在对这些话语进行分析之后提出的问题并未完全摆脱对知识动力装置的分析：历史话语哲学的实践政治性质如何在政治实践中有效地保持沉默？从“秩序”和“历史”认识论领域的不连续性阐明了福柯的“历史”概念后，将以Turgot和Vico为例，说明这种哲学历史话语破裂的犹豫不决。哈维尔·加维兹·阿奎尔（JavierGálvezAguirre），“历史的构成：米歇尔·福柯考古学的批判性观点”，第2页，共9页CLCWeb：比较文学与文化20.4（2018）：主体化的特殊过程：生物政治与文学政治。埃德 Azucena G. Blanco JavierGálvezAGUIRRE历史的构成：米歇尔·福柯考古学的批判观点如果必须以大写“ H”谈论历史，那么这应该是人类历史，事件史，能够使某个故事产生的奇点。在可以研究历史的范围内，它还需要某些标准，一种方法，怀疑历史及其奇异性也可以表明规律性。自《事物秩序》以来，福柯表达了进行任何类型的历史研究所特有的兴趣和问题。当施加通过考古方法进行检查的义务时，这个问题变得更加严重：历史不再只是时间流；这种流动总是伴随着一定的知识色彩，关于这种历史的某种观念，使人们无法将其视为曾经是纯粹的物体。然而，历史作为暂时性，继续从其矛盾的位置表明冲离某种知识秩序的冲动。正是当我们试图从特定的时代框架来理解历史时，特别是出于对人类历史性的兴趣而出现的历史时，即当历史与人文科学之间的区别变得更加明显时。因此，应该这样说：历史不能按照事物的顺序作为人类科学之一包括在内。福柯研究了与现代话语有关的问题，一种旨在消解客观性的话语，而我们至今仍在其中一部分受其束缚：由于创造了世界历史（自然史，经济史，语言史）的事实，人类自己变得非历史化。但是在此过程中，人们着手寻找事物的时间，意识到历史只与人有关，这是对事物的历史进行指定，分类和理解的人：在很深的层次上，存在着人类的历史性。本身既有自己的历史，又有彻底的分散，为所有其他历史奠定了基础。正是这种主要的侵蚀，十九世纪才开始着眼于使一切历史化，写下一切的通史，不断地回溯过去，并将最稳定的事物置于自由的时间流中。再次重申，毫无疑问，我们应该修改传统上书写历史史的方式。（福柯，第403号命令）自19世纪以来，人们对人类及其历史的兴趣已从一个自相矛盾的立场中得以客观化：在时间框架中理解了行动的特殊性和相对性，但与此同时，这种相对性是为了解释的规律性，它逐渐被侵蚀了。这是一个反馈过程的问题：古典时期先验先验的典型规律已经失去了它们自己特定的表述领域。就历史而言，古典时期的典型特征是什么？研究被分析对象中存在的规律性。历史，在古典认识论的框架中，是秩序。如果福柯本人没有参加1975-1976年的法兰西学院讲课，事情似乎就这么简单。在这些以《必须捍卫社会》为标题的演讲中，福柯提议分析种族主义话语的家谱。据我所知，该文本并未被专业文献高度引用（与生物政治学的诞生或安全，领土，人口等其他文献相比），提供了再次使福柯成为可能的关键，与思想史传统的对话更加开放。最终，这是一段文本，其中所讨论的话题也可能是思想史的直接对象（从福柯的意义上来说）。这些讲座的目的是对直到18世纪末历史故事的叙事进行考古分析。最高潮是资产阶级历史哲学中对这些叙事的重新吸收，资产阶级历史中具有进步词汇的资产阶级。因此，这不是赞扬这种吸收的问题，而是对某些话语结晶过程的确认。尽管进行了这种评估，但历史哲学的典型主张并不是本文的重点。对某种历史学科概念的批评是作者不断对其进行操作的背景噪音。从《知识考古学》中提出的方法学划界（以划定知识的构成要素）到他在《必须捍卫的社会》中所呈现的历史的对比，福柯描述了一种最少的，粗俗的历史，最少的倾向。封闭的系统以及本体神学（在这种情况下，也是目的论）的所有那些特征性产品，而忽略了它们所运行的知识的物质实践。目的是积极建立（a）我们目前的自我理解的一系列调查方法，（b）哈维尔·加尔维斯·阿奎尔（JavierGálvezAguirre）政治建设中的替代路线，“历史的构成：米歇尔的批判观点”福柯的考古学”（第3页，共9页）CLCWeb：主体化的特殊过程：生物政治与文学政治。埃德 Azucena G. Blanco自己。就福柯提出全盘解释历史的另一种模式而言，福柯几乎没有提供任何关于未来的迹象。否则，这不足为奇：将自己与历史的所有传统形而上学结构相脱离，成为摆脱整个历史-哲学词典的代名词。这意味着破坏这样的历史（具有大写“ H”，线性，对西方文明模式无可避免的倾向的历史），没有提供对未来希望的预言，不信任任何基于技术及其（据说）终结论的人类学预测提前。值得一提的是，福柯的古生物学 包括未达到最知名的学科水平的原始知识的论述。或者，在最好的情况下，将原始知识重新吸收到可以对其进行根本调整的学科逻辑中。简而言之，这是一个改善某些沉默的话语的问题。但是，这并不能给他们一种优于主流话语的“道德等级”，因为它们不一定是被压迫者的声音（Foucault，Society 76）。它仅对我们有用，可作为进行更复杂的批判本体的一种指示，即使在潜移默化的情况下，也更适合于呈现给我们的现实，尽管这些论述​​直到今天仍然部分地被确定下来。有了这个简短的解释，我已经展示了富考的任务与对历史哲学的批判之间关系的一种可能的例证路径，特别是那些在18世纪末至19世纪中叶出现的历史哲学之间的关系。在一定程度上，对历史知识（自然史，经济学，人类学）的考古学阅读开创了现代历史的核心，历史的哲学建构进入了一个严峻的境地：毫无疑问，谈论目的论或历史中的真理，单向的宗族，运动中的法律或进步。哲学性质的历史的所有建构都是巨大的，由于它倾向于在历史和知识之间建立一种辩证法，它在意识形态上扭曲了所有资产阶级的行动，所有现代主权国家以追求普遍性的愿望，因此它应受到质疑。因此，对历史的现代建构进行批判并不意味着消除对它的历史以及其建构进行理性而批判性研究的可能性（Paponi 26）。就事件的叙事结构旨在具有“了解”，“概念上的严肃性”的地位而言，问题的焦点将被政治化。叙述将从“休闲文学”或“道德行为指标”变为 批评历史的现代建构并不意味着消除对它的历史，其建构进行理性而批判性研究的可能性（Paponi 26）。就事件的叙事结构旨在具有“了解”，“概念上的严肃性”的地位而言，问题的焦点将被政治化。叙述将从“休闲文学”或“道德行为指标”变为 批评历史的现代建构并不意味着消除对它的历史，其建构进行理性而批判性研究的可能性（Paponi 26）。就事件的叙事结构旨在具有“了解”，“概念上的严肃性”的地位而言，问题的焦点将被政治化。叙述将从“休闲文学”或“道德行为指标”变为