The major argument against Ramsey-style epistemic structural realism is the model-theoretic refinement of Newman’s objection against Russell, presented in Ketland (Brit J Philos Sci 55(2): 409–424, 2004), where a technical result is interpreted as showing that the Ramsey-sentence approach collapses into instrumentalism. This paper addresses some questions raised by the application of model theory to the scientific realism debate. Firstly, I will suggest three different formal semantics for the positions in the debate. Then, some technicalities of Ketland’s result will be scrutinized in light of comments by Zahar and Demopoulos. Finally, I will formalize Ketland’s argument by means of an intensional operator and focus on one problematic premise. The conclusion is that, with some adjustments, the Ramsey-sentence approach can represent an intermediate position between realism and instrumentalism, but the term “structuralism” does not suit it well.

反对拉姆齐式的认识论结构现实主义的主要论点是纽曼对罗素的反对的模型理论上的完善，该论点在科特兰提出（Brit J Philos Sci 55（2）：409-424，2004），其中技术结果被解释为显示Ramsey句子方法崩溃为工具主义。本文讨论了模型理论在科学现实主义辩论中的应用提出的一些问题。首先，我将为辩论中的立场提出三种不同的形式语义。然后，将根据Zahar和Demopoulos的评论来审查Ketland结果的某些技术性。最后，我将通过内涵运算符来形式化Ketland的论点，并集中在一个有问题的前提上。结论是，经过一些调整，