Drawing on social comparison and equity theory, this study examines the influence of reward strategies a manufacturer in a focal dyad employs on the cooperative behaviors of other observing firms in a dealer network. We test the hypotheses using a survey of 234 auto manufacturer–dealership relationships. The results reveal that (1) reward observation frequency has a negative effect on the cooperation of observers, (2) observer network centrality amplifies the negative effect of reward observation frequency on the cooperation of observers, and (3) network density dampens the negative effect of reward observation frequency on the cooperation of observers. The findings suggest that managers must be aware of the nuanced consequences of this “spillover” effect of rewards in shaping their influence strategies within the context of the larger business network.

这项研究利用社会比较和公平理论，考察了焦点双子中的制造商采用的奖励策略对经销商网络中其他观察公司的合作行为的影响。我们使用对234家汽车制造商与经销商之间的关系的调查来检验这些假设。结果表明：（1）奖励观察频率对观察者合作产生负面影响；（2）观察者网络中心性放大了奖励观察频率对观察者合作的负面影响；（3）网络密度减弱了负面影响。奖励观察频率对观察者合作的影响。