In coalition formation, bargainers with many resources are often excluded from coalitions (the Strength-is-Weakness effect). Literature suggests this effect is driven by high-resource bargainers using self-serving allocation rules that backfire, as they prefer equity over equality (while low-resource bargainers prefer the opposite). Four studies test (1) whether this is actually the case and (2) whether high-resource bargainers solely consider equitable allocations or whether they consider both equity and equality but actively choose equity as an allocation rule. We find the Strength-is-Weakness effect even when equality rules are made salient, strengthening the idea that the high-resource bargainers actively select equity as their framework for fairness to attempt to maximize their outcomes. The studies, also suggest an additional reason for the exclusion of high-resource bargainers. We find that high-resource bargainers are likely avoided because they are expected to bargain self-servingly, making the low-resource bargainers seek each other out.

中文翻译：

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是什么导致联盟形成中的“优势就是劣势”效应：被动采用还是主动选择自私的分配规则？

在联盟形成中，拥有许多资源的讨价还价者通常被排除在联盟之外（力量就是弱点效应）。文献表明，这种效果是由使用自私分配规则的高资源谈判者推动的，结果适得其反，因为他们更喜欢公平而不是平等（而低资源谈判者则相反）。四项研究检验 (1) 是否确实如此，以及 (2) 高资源谈判者是否只考虑公平分配，或者他们是否同时考虑公平和平等但积极选择公平作为分配规则。我们发现即使在平等规则变得突出的情况下，优势就是劣势效应，强化了高资源谈判者积极选择公平作为他们的公平框架以试图最大化他们的结果的想法。研究，还提出了排除高资源谈判者的另一个原因。我们发现高资源讨价还价者可能会被回避，因为他们是期望自私地讨价还价，使资源匮乏的讨价还价者相互寻找。