We develop a theory of asymmetries between voluntary and mandatory disclosure. Efficiently designed mandatory disclosure policies are substitutes for excessive voluntary disclosures. The efficient policy takes the form of a lower threshold below which firms must disclose bad news and an upper threshold above which firms voluntarily disclose good news. Hence mandatory disclosures are asymmetric and feature conservative reporting of bad news. The threshold to recognize bad news increases when information is more precise. We also characterize interactions between disclosures and real decisions in environments where information has social value: investment decisions, optimal liquidations, and adverse selection in a lemons market.

我们建立了自愿披露和强制披露之间的不对称理论。有效设计的强制性披露政策可以替代过多的自愿性披露。有效政策的形式是：企业必须披露坏消息的门槛较低，企业自愿披露好消息的门槛较高。因此，强制性披露是不对称的，并且保守地报告了坏消息。当信息更加精确时，识别坏消息的阈值会增加。我们还描述了在具有社会价值的环境中，披露与真实决策之间的相互作用：投资决策，最优清算和柠檬市场的逆向选择。