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Does a deposit insurance scheme induce moral hazard among bankers? Evidence from an experiment with bankers
Gadjah Mada International Journal of Business Pub Date : 2018-12-30 , DOI: 10.22146/gamaijb.38873
Gumilang Aryo Sahadewo , Bernardinus Maria Purwanto , Rimawan Pradiptyo

The implementation of a deposit insurance scheme entails a trade off. On one hand, as shown in theoretical and empirical studies, a deposit insurance scheme reduces the likelihood of a bank run. On the other hand, a deposit insurance scheme induces moral hazard among bankers that may lead to bank failures. We rigorously test the effect of different deposit coverage limit and the implementation of a differential premium treatment on bankers’ behaviors in the deposit and credit market. We do so by designing a laboratory experiment that involves real bankers as participants. We find that the coverage limit treatments do not have any effect on deposit rate offer. Nevertheless, we find that a high deposit coverage limit induces smaller banks to have a higher share of risky projects. This is evidence of moral hazard particularly among small banks.

中文翻译:

存款保险计划会在银行家中引发道德风险吗?银行家实验的证据

存款保险计划的实施需要权衡。一方面,如理论和实证研究所示,存款保险计划降低了银行挤兑的可能性。另一方面,存款保险计划在银行家中引起道德风险,可能导致银行倒闭。我们严格测试了不同的存款覆盖率限制以及实施差别保费待遇对银行在存款和信贷市场中行为的影响。为此,我们设计了一个实验室实验,让真正的银行家参加。我们发现,承保范围限制处理对存款利率报价没有任何影响。但是,我们发现较高的存款覆盖率限制会导致较小的银行在风险项目中占有较高的份额。这是道德风险的证据,尤其是在小型银行中。
更新日期:2018-12-30
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