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The risk management role of nonexecutive directors: from capital expenditure perspective
European Journal of Management and Business Economics Pub Date : 2020-09-16 , DOI: 10.1108/ejmbe-12-2019-0237
Tho Anh To , Yoshihisa Suzuki , Hong Thu Thi Ho , Siem Thi Tran , Tuan Quoc Tran

Purpose

This study investigates the impact of board independence on firm risk of Vietnamese listed firms and the moderating effect of capital expenditure on this relationship.

Design/methodology/approach

This paper applies fixed effects and dynamic generalized method of moments (GMM) models to examine hypothesized associations between the proportion of nonexecutive directors and stock return volatility, as well as the moderating effect of capital expenditure. The robustness tests are implemented by applying alternative measures of overinvestment and firm risk.

Findings

The results show that the presence of nonexecutive directors on board increases firm risk. However, the combination of nonexecutive ratio and capital expenditure ratio has a significant negative impact on firm risk. The result is also confirmed by the difference between the monitoring role of nonexecutive directors in overinvesting and underinvesting firms.

Research limitations/implications

The results imply that Vietnamese listed firms take stock return volatility into consideration before nominating and appointing nonexecutive directors into their board, especially in overinvesting firms. From another perspective, the shift toward having a majority of nonexecutive directors on boards can play a significant role in pursuing a stable or risky business strategy.

Originality/value

This paper investigates the influences of nonexecutive directors on firm risk in the context of Vietnam.



中文翻译:

非执行董事的风险管理角色:从资本支出的角度

目的

本研究调查了董事会独立性对越南上市公司风险的影响以及资本支出对这种关系的调节作用。

设计/方法/方法

本文应用固定效应和动态广义矩量法 (GMM) 模型来检验非执行董事比例与股票回报波动率之间的假设关联,以及资本支出的调节作用。稳健性测试是通过应用过度投资和公司风险的替代措施来实施的。

发现

结果表明,董事会中非执行董事的存在增加了公司风险。然而,非执行比率和资本支出比率的组合对公司风险有显着的负面影响。非执行董事在过度投资和投资不足公司中的监督作用之间的差异也证实了这一结果。

研究限制/影响

结果表明,越南上市公司在提名和任命非执行董事进入董事会之前,特别是在过度投资的公司中,考虑了股票回报的波动性。从另一个角度来看,董事会中非执行董事占大多数的转变可以在追求稳定或风险的业务战略方面发挥重要作用。

原创性/价值

本文研究了越南背景下非执行董事对公司风险的影响。

更新日期:2020-09-16
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