Revolution simultaneously legitimises and denies the coordinate centre of the political order of Modernity. It is difficult to describe the historical evolution from the early industrial, class-national forms of political organisation to late or global Modernity other than in terms of a low-intensity revolution in the rate of social change. On the other hand, this permanent modernisation is not revolutionary in the sense that the periodic splits of elites, colour revolutions, coups and national liberation movements do not in and of themselves make demands for fundamental change in the value-institutional core of the political order of Modernity. The potential for a new revolution can be consequent only on a repudiation of Modernity in favour of an alternative political project having a greater capability for universalisation and totalisation. If, in legitimising its liberal consensus and nation-state models as the dominant political format of their synthesis, capitalism is the value-institutional quintessence of the political order of Modernity, it is precisely in challenges to capitalism, the liberal consensus and nationalism that provide the most obvious means for crystallising revolutionary movements. From such a perspective, capitalism increasingly comes up against the global limits of its expansion, with class ideologies degenerating into a fragmented, technologically-intermediated populism, and nationstates experiencing increasing pressure from alternative political formats (city networks, multinational corporations, etc.) as they attempt to preserve the model of the social state. While various discourses and social groups profess to play the role of revolutionary utopias 1 The article is prepared with the support of RFBR grant No. 18-011-00211 “Social Consensus in Russia: Mechanisms for Ideological and Institutional Regulation”. 144 Victor Martianov and subjects, in essence, their ability to present a totalising alternative to late Modernity remains an open question. A utopian systemic challenge to Modernity, connected with a morally more justified configuration and associated hierarchy of legitimate violence, is yet to emerge, whether from within Modernity or some source external to it. It is demonstrated that in the long term a serious (and possibly revolutionary) correction of the political order of modern societies will be capable of producing a rental transformation of capitalism and an expansion of the rent-class stratification mechanisms associated with precarisation, along with a reduction of social mobility trajectories and the prospects of active social groups.

中文翻译：

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革命与现代

革命同时合法化并否定了现代性政治秩序的协调中心。除了用低强度的社会变革速度革命来描述之外，很难描述从早期的工业，阶级国家的政治组织到晚期或全球现代性的历史演变。另一方面，这种永久的现代化并不是革命性的，精英阶层的周期性分裂，色彩革命，政变和民族解放运动本身并没有要求对政治秩序的价值制度核心进行根本性改变。现代性。新革命的潜力只有在放弃现代性之后，才可能支持具有更大的普遍性和全面性的替代性政治项目。如果，在将其自由主义共识和民族国家模式合法化为其综合的主要政治格式时，资本主义是现代性政治秩序的价值体制精髓，恰恰是在资本主义，自由主义共识和民族主义的挑战中，资本主义提供了最大的挑战。明确革命运动的明显手段。从这样的角度来看，资本主义正日益面临其扩张的全球范围的限制，阶级意识形态沦为零散的，技术上介导的民粹主义，民族国家正遭受来自替代政治形式（城市网络，跨国公司等）的越来越大的压力。他们试图保留社会状态的模型。虽然各种言论和社会团体自称在发挥革命性的乌托邦的作用1这篇文章是在RFBR第18-011-00211号拨款“俄罗斯的社会共识：意识形态和制度调节机制”的支持下编写的。144维克多·马蒂安诺（Victor Martianov）和他的研究对象，从本质上讲，他们有能力提出现代晚期的替代方案，这仍然是一个悬而未决的问题。不论是从现代性内部还是现代性外部，对现代性的乌托邦系统性挑战与道德上更合理的配置和合法暴力的等级联系在一起，都尚未出现。