Abstract In this paper, we consider the impact of patents and R&D cooperation on R&D investments in the oligopolistic industry with differentiated products. Four types of firms’ conduct are investigated: R&D competition without patents, R&D competition with patent protection, R&D cooperation, and the full industry cooperation. The obtained results suggest that patents do not necessarily promote R&D investments due to the existence of so called tournament effects. R&D cooperation stimulates R&D investments, but R&D cooperation provides sufficient incentives to create a full industry cartel. Such a cartel works to the detriment of consumers. Our analysis led us to the conclusion that for a relatively low level of R&D spillovers, the policy-makers should promote R&D competition without patent protection among oligopolistic firms. For a relatively high level of R&D spillovers, R&D cooperation enhances innovation, but the regulator should monitor the market for probable collusion.

中文翻译：

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专利和研发合作对差异化商品行业研发投资的影响

摘要在本文中，我们考虑了专利和研发合作对具有差异化产品的寡头行业的研发投资的影响。调查了四种类型的公司行为：无专利的研发竞争，有专利保护的研发竞争，研发合作和全行业合作。获得的结果表明，由于存在所谓的锦标赛效应，专利并不一定促进研发投资。研发合作刺激了研发投资，但研发合作为建立完整的行业卡特尔提供了充分的动力。这样的卡特尔不利于消费者。我们的分析得出的结论是，对于相对较低的R＆D溢出水平，决策者应该促进R＆D的发展。垄断企业之间没有专利保护的D竞争。对于相对较高的R＆D溢出，R＆D合作可以增强创新能力，但监管机构应监视市场中可能存在的合谋。