The European Journal of the History of Economic Thought ( IF 0.514 ) Pub Date : 2021-02-01 Enrico Petracca
Abstract
This paper discusses why in the 1950s Herbert Simon introduced bounded rationality as a modular notion—consisting of a “cognitive” and an “environmental” module—and explores the consequences of this choice. Originally, Simon emphasised cognition in economics and the environment in psychology to meet specific disciplinary interests. Continuing adaptively to emphasise cognition in economics has led, then, to significant unintended consequences: (i) the easier assimilation of Simon’s bounded rationality by neoclassical economics, and (ii) the persistent confusion between Simon’s and Kahneman and Tversky’s contribution. Seeing the recognition of his credit endangered, Simon reemphasised the environment when Gigerenzer introduced environment-based ecological rationality.
中文翻译:
关于西蒙的有限理性经济学模块化方法的起源和后果
摘要
本文讨论了为什么在1950年代赫伯特·西蒙(Herbert Simon)将有限理性作为一种模块化概念(由“认知”和“环境”模块组成)引入并探讨了这种选择的后果。最初,西蒙(Simon)强调经济学的认知和心理学的环境,以满足特定的学科兴趣。因此,继续以适应性的方式强调经济学中的认知导致了重大的意想不到的后果:(i)新古典经济学更容易吸收西蒙的有限理性,(ii)西蒙与卡尼曼和特维尔斯基的贡献之间的持续困惑。西蒙(Simon)意识到自己的信誉受到威胁,因此在吉格瑞泽(Gigerenzer)引入基于环境的生态合理性时再次强调了环境。