ABSTRACT Twenty years after India formally staked claims to nuclear weapons power status its nuclear trajectory evokes surprise. The first element of surprise concerns the nature of India’s arsenal, which is operational in the field and not recessed or hidden in the basement. The surprise’s second element concerns the arsenal’s ambitious scope, which is shaping into a triad with an extraregional strike capability. This article tackles the underlying assumptions that are baked into the dominant scholarly discourses on India’s nuclear history, particularly discourses on nuclear symbolism, norms, strategic culture, and institutions. It critically analyzes these discourses to show that the prestige and symbolism discourse infers motives from evidence that is ambiguous. The claim that Indian leaders in the two decades prior to 1998 were normatively disinclined to favor nuclear weaponization is empirically incorrect. Likewise, the thesis that India’s strategic culture disfavors operational nuclear forces is based on a selective and biased reading of the available evidence. Finally, scholars have overstated India’s historic civil-military institutional dysfunction. Because the above discourses have dominated our understanding of India’s nuclear politics, the subsequent developments appear unexpected and surprising.

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为什么印度作为常规核武器的力量在1998年后的演变中令人吃惊

摘要在印度正式宣布拥有核武器的地位后二十年，其核弹道令人吃惊。令人惊讶的第一个因素涉及印度武器库的性质，该武器库在现场运行，没有隐蔽或隐藏在地下室中。突袭的第二个要素涉及兵工厂的雄心勃勃的范围，该范围正在演变为具有区域外打击能力的三合会。本文讨论了有关印度核历史的主要学术论述中所包含的基本假设，特别是有关核象征主义，规范，战略文化和体制的论述。它批判性地分析了这些话语，以显示声望和象征主义话语从模棱两可的证据中推断出动机。从经验上讲，在1998年之前的20年中印度领导人在规范上不愿支持核武器的说法是错误的。同样，印度的战略文化不利于核作战力量的论点也是基于对现有证据的选择性和有偏见的解读。最后，学者们夸大了印度历史悠久的军民体制功能失调。由于上述论述主导了我们对印度核政治的理解，因此随后的事态发展似乎是出乎意料和令人惊讶的。学者们夸大了印度历史悠久的军民体制功能失调。由于上述论述主导了我们对印度核政治的理解，因此随后的事态发展似乎是出乎意料和令人惊讶的。学者们夸大了印度历史悠久的军民体制功能失调。由于上述论述主导了我们对印度核政治的理解，因此随后的事态发展似乎是出乎意料和令人惊讶的。