ABSTRACT Arms control treaties have served admirably to control and limit nuclear weapons for several decades. The provisions and limits, however, have proven to be inflexible, often limited in scope to specific systems and countries, and difficult and time-consuming to negotiate. It is time for the nuclear weapons states to consider a new paradigm to incentivize reductions while building security and stability in a more enduring and expandable format. Previous nuclear weapons security cooperative efforts between the US and Russia under the Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) program demonstrated that countries can share data and access on nuclear warheads. Under a new cooperative forum to be established by the US and Russia and then expanded to include all five declared nuclear weapons states, a new paradigm can be envisioned that would allow for modernization as a trade-off for reductions and increases in security and stability measures. The nuclear weapons states should create an enduring forum to negotiate trade-off formulas and implement them through specific contracts to be managed as issues and technologies arise. As security and stability measures strengthen, the nuclear weapons states can increase incentives to roll back inventories on a continuous basis.

中文翻译：

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超越军备控制：减少合作核武器–减少核武器并提高安全性和稳定性的新范式

摘要军备控制条约在控制和限制核武器方面已有数十年历史。但是，这些规定和限制已被证明是不灵活的，通常在范围上仅限于特定的系统和国家，并且谈判困难且耗时。现在是时候让核武器国家考虑一种新的范式来激励削减，同时以更持久和可扩展的形式建立安全与稳定。美国和俄罗斯先前在“减少合作威胁”（CTR）计划下进行的核武器安全合作努力表明，各国可以共享核弹头的数据和使用权。在美国和俄罗斯建立的一个新的合作论坛下，然后扩大到包括所有五个宣布的核武器国家在内，可以设想一个新的范式，以实现现代化，作为减少和增加安全与稳定措施的权衡。核武器国家应建立一个持久的论坛，以谈判取舍方案，并通过具体合同执行这些方案，并在出现问题和技术时加以管理。随着安全和稳定措施的加强，核武器国家可以增加持续减少库存的动机。