The new externalist picture of natural kind terms due to Kripke, Putnam, and others has become quite popular in philosophy. Many philosophers of science have remained sceptical. Häggqvist and Wikforss have recently criticised this view severely. They contend it depends essentially on a micro-essentialist view of natural kinds that is widely rejected among philosophers of science, and that a scientifically reasonable metaphysics entails the resurrection of some version of descriptivism. It is argued in this paper that the situation is not quite as dark for the new theory of reference as many critics suggest. There are several distinct questions here which should not be conflated and ought to be dealt with one by one. Descriptivism remains arguably problematic.

由于克里普克，普特南和其他人的缘故，对自然种类术语的新的外在主义描述在哲学上已经变得相当流行。许多科学哲学家仍然持怀疑态度。Häggqvist和Wikforss最近严厉批评了这一观点。他们认为，这基本上取决于自然哲学的微观本质观，这种观点被科学哲学家广泛拒绝，科学上合理的形而上学要求某种形式的描述主义的复活。本文认为，对于新的参考理论而言，情况并不像许多批评家所建议的那样黑暗。这里有几个截然不同的问题，不应混为一谈，应一一处理。描述主义仍然是有问题的。